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Public Accountability of Public Prosecutions 
 
Kenny Yang∗ 
 
The role of the Prosecutor and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion can have an enormous 
impact on the outcome of criminal proceedings. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion is, 
however, often secretive and misunderstood. There have been concerns that a lack of 
accountability and transparency can result in a fertile bed for corruption. This article considers the 
development of the prosecution system in Australia. It analyses the discretion that the Prosecutor 
wields and examines Australian attempts at safeguarding this discretion. It points out the problems 
with the Australian system of prosecution and suggests that there is room for greater public 
accountability of the Prosecutor’s role. In the search for a solution to the prosecutorial 
conundrum, the article examines the Japanese model of ‘democratic’ public prosecution to see if 
such a system could be adopted in Australia. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In discussions on criminal law, there is ample literature and debate on the role of the judiciary 
and the laws passed by the legislature. What is often forgotten however, is the role the Public 
Prosecutor1 plays and the ambit of the Prosecutor’s discretion in the commencement and 
conduct of criminal proceedings. While the legislature and judiciary are subject to public 
scrutiny and pegged to standards of transparency and independence, the role of the Prosecutor 
is often not known, and thus slips under the net of such scrutiny.  
 
Indeed, as this article will argue, the Prosecutor often possesses immense discretion that 
could have a severe impact on criminal proceedings and the accused. Australia’s current 
system of prosecution attempts to give some degree of independence to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions. To understand this, the article will look at the historical developments that 
resulted in the establishment of the office of Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’) in 
Australia that aims to be independent, fair and accountable.  
 
This paper will then highlight the concentration of power in the Prosecutor and the problems 
associated with this system. The article will examine whether public prosecution can truly be 
‘public’. It will analyse the Japanese system of ‘democratizing’ prosecution and examine 
whether this may be effective in tempering prosecutorial discretion and allowing a public 
voice in the prosecution arena and look at whether such a solution can be transposed into an 
Australian setting. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗ LLB (Hons) (Murdoch), GDLP (ANU), Barrister & Solicitor (Western Australia), Deputy Public Prosecutor & 
State Counsel (Attorney-General’s Chambers, Singapore). I am deeply grateful to Lorraine Finlay for her 
expertise and guidance in this article. The views in this article are my own and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the Attorney General’s Chambers, Singapore. All errors are my own. 
1 The precise term used to define the role may differ depending on the jurisdiction. In Australia, prosecutorial 
functions are carried out by ‘State Prosecutors’ or ‘Police Prosecutors’ and are directed by a ‘Director of Public 
Prosecutions’. For the purposes of this article, the term ‘Prosecutor’ will be used to refer to government officials 
vested with the authority to initiate and conduct criminal proceedings. 
Kenny Yang                                           Public Accountability of Public Prosecutions 
 
 
Murdoch University Law Review (2013) 20(1)  29 
 
 
2. The Prosecutor’s Role in the Criminal Justice System 
 
2.1 Checks and Balances 
 
Western liberals have long accepted that a government with unchecked powers increases the 
likelihood of abuse of those powers. A system of checks and balances exists to ensure that the 
powers of the State are exercised appropriately and only when necessary. In the words of 
Montesquieu, ‘there is no liberty, if the judicial power be not separated from the executive 
and legislative’.2 
 
The separation of powers doctrine thus has state power organized in three separate branches: 
the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, each acting ‘as the means of keeping each 
other in their proper places’. While this separation of powers is important in all facets of 
governance and law, it is arguably even more so in matters of criminal law as this affects the 
liberty and life of individuals. 
 
It is in the criminal law where one is able to witness the ‘fascinating inter-play between the 
different branches of government’.3  
 
The Legislature makes the laws which define what a crime is, and which also prescribes what 
the processes should be; the Executive runs the enforcement machinery from detection and 
investigation to prosecution; and the Judiciary adjudicates guilt or innocence, and, if 
necessary, the punishment, on the material presented to it by the prosecution and the 
defendant; the Executive once again takes over and carries out the sentence of the court.4   
 
From the completion of an offence to conviction and sentencing, the ball of control first starts 
with the legislature, made up of elected officials, to define the necessary elements of an 
offence. It then passes to the executive for investigation and prosecution and finally to the 
judiciary, made up of appointed judicial officers who are, in an ideal system, given 
independence and are thus free of  influence from  the other two branches. It is the executive 
control of this process and, within it, the exercise of the Prosecutor’s power and discretion 
that is the concern of this article. 
 
2.2 The Public Prosecutor’s Role 
 
In Australia, prosecutorial functions were traditionally carried out by the Attorney-General. 
Today, this role has fallen to the Directors of Public Prosecutions of the States and the 
Commonwealth, through the respective enabling legislation.5 While the precise term may 
vary across jurisdictions, there is usually provision for a ‘Public Prosecutor’,6 whose primary 
function is to prosecute offences against the law of the land. In carrying out this duty, the 
Prosecutor has to make certain decisions. This includes whether or not to prosecute, and if so, 
                                                 
2 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Thomas Nugent trans, 1949) 51; James Madison, The Federalist No 51 
(1961) 347. 
3 Michael Hor, ‘The Independence of the Criminal Justice System in Singapore’ [2002] Singapore Journal of 
Legal Studies 497, 497. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Rod Harvey, ‘The Independence of the Prosecutor: A Police Perspective’ (Paper presented at the Australian 
Institute of Criminology Conference: Prosecuting Justice, Melbourne, 18 April 1996) 5. 
6 Above n 1. 
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to choose from the plethora of available charges arising from the same set of facts. The 
Prosecutor also assists the court by making submissions fairly and in an even handed 
manner,7 which may include applications on points of the criminal process from pre-trial 
hearings through to the trial itself, sentencing and appeals on both conviction and sentence, if 
necessary.8  
 
In the exercise of these functions, the Prosecutor is meant to act fairly in seeking the truth and 
to represent the community rather than any individual or sectional interest.9  While the 
Prosecutor is the adversary of the accused in our adversarial system,10 the Prosecutor as 
‘minister for justice’11 is not entitled to act as if representing private interests in litigation.  A 
Prosecutor ‘acts independently, yet in the public interest’.12 The role of the Public Prosecutor 
is not to push for a conviction,13 but to assist the court in arriving at the truth.14 A Prosecutor 
does not represent a particular client,15 but serves the community and, in doing so, must act in 
the spirit of fairness. To this extent, the accused and the community can expect that the 
Prosecutor ‘will act with fairness and detachment and always with the objectives of 
establishing the whole truth in accordance with procedures and standards which the law 
requires to be observed and of helping to ensure that the accused’s trial is a fair one’.16 
 
2.3 Ball Passing 
 
At a cursory glance, this ‘ball-passing’ of control from one branch of government to the other 
ensures that each is accountable to the other and reduces the risk of one branch being overly 
influenced by another. While the Westminster model of governance has accepted that some 
overlap between the legislature and executive cannot be avoided,17 the judiciary remains 
separate and independent. This ensures that the risk of abuse is minimized and the liberty and 
rights of individuals are protected.18  
 
However, upon closer examination, the executive’s role and specifically, the Prosecutor’s 
position is one of a special nature – it essentially forms the bridge that links the legislature’s 
definition of an offence to the judiciary’s adjudication of guilt or innocence. As the two 
institutions are independent of each other, it is up to the Prosecutor, upon receiving the ‘ball’, 
to decide when, how, and indeed whether or not to pass said ‘ball’ to the judiciary for 
adjudication. 
                                                 
7 R v Tait and Bartley (1979) 46 ALR 473, 477; David Ross, Crime (Lawbook, 2nd ed, 2004) 749. 
8 R v Allpass (1993) 72 A Crim R 561. 
9 Livermore v R [2006] NSWCCA 334; Eric Colvin and John McKechnie, Criminal Law in Queensland and 
Western Australia: Cases and Commentary (LexisNexis, 5th ed, 2008) 739.  
10 R v Karounos (1995) 63 SASR 452, 465-6, 493. 
11 Harvey, above n 6. 
12 Critics have however mentioned that these concepts are ‘so diffuse and elastic that they do not constrain 
prosecutors much’, see Stephanos Bibas, ‘Prosecutorial Regulations versus Prosecutorial Accountability’ (2009) 
157 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 959, 961. 
13 Stanley Yeo, Neil Morgan and Chan Wing Cheong, Criminal Law in Malaysia and Singapore (LexisNexis, 
2nd ed, 2012) 28. 
14 Colvin and McKechnie, above n 10. 
15 Harvey, above n 5. 
16 Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657, 663. This includes avoiding the use of temperate or emotive 
language which may prejudice the jury – see  Livermore v R [2006] NSWCCA 334 where the Court took 
objection to the prosecution repeatedly referring to a witness as ‘an idiot’, cited in Colvin and McKechnie, 
above n 9, 740. 
17 Stanley de Smith, The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions (Stevens, 1964) 131-149. 
18 Hor, above n 3. 
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The special position the Prosecutor is in is arguably compounded given that the judiciary in 
the adversarial common law system, while having final authority in deciding the matter, is 
only a passive adjudicator,19 having a limited role in the commencement and conduct of 
criminal proceedings. For practical and constitutional reasons, it is neither expected, nor 
desired, that the courts play a more inquisitorial role in an adversarial system.20 As such, the 
court can only consider matters that have been brought before it, based on materials presented 
by both parties.21 The courts are also constrained in having to deal with the cases before them 
on a case-by-case basis, affording each the full attention and consideration of the court.22  
 
While the Prosecutor has some limitations - for example, in Australia it is well accepted that 
a Prosecutor should play no role in the investigation of offences and is thus reliant on 
enforcement and investigative authorities to pursue matters - the Prosecutor does play an 
important role in the pre-trial decision making process and in court. He/she decides whether 
or not to proceed on charges and which charges to proceed on. If proceeding on a matter, 
he/she acts as an advocate before the court, selecting which materials to present and in doing 
so, is given great leeway in deciding the form of such presentation, or indeed whether the 
case at hand warrants such presentation.23 More than a passive receiver of workload, the 
Prosecutor ‘screens’ cases and decides which are worthy of proceeding on and to what extent. 
The Prosecutor’s importance within the criminal justice system cannot be overestimated.24 
 
2.4 Prosecutorial Discretion 
 
The Macquarie Dictionary defines discretion as the ‘power or right of deciding, or of acting 
according to one’s own judgment; freedom of judgment or choice.’25 In the context of a 
Prosecutor’s discretion, this refers to the wide scope given to commence, conduct, direct, take 
over and conduct criminal proceedings on behalf of the State, as its advocate.26According to 
Davis: 
 
Discretion is indispensable for the individualization of justice (governments of laws and 
men). It is necessary as rules alone cannot cope with the complexities of modern 
government…Where law ends, discretion begins and the exercise of discretion may mean 
beneficence or tyranny, justice or injustice, reasonableness or arbitrariness.27 
 
                                                 
19 William A Hamilton and Charles R Work, ‘The Prosecutor’s Role in the Urban Court System: The Case for 
Management Consciousness’ (1973) 64 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 183. 
20 Michael A Simons, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling 
Federalization’ (2002) 75 New York University Law Review 893, 897. 
21 Hamilton and Work, above n 19. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Bibas, above n 12. 
25 Susan Butler (ed), Macquarie Dictionary (Macquarie, 5th ed, 2009) 479; Richard Refshauge, ‘Prosecutorial 
Discretion – Australia’ in Gabriël A Moens and Rodolphe Biffot (eds), The Convergence of Legal Systems in the 
21st Century (CopyRight Publishing, 2002) 353, 358. The Concise Australian Legal Dictionary defines 
discretion as ‘the power or authority of a decision maker to choose between alternatives, or to choose no 
alternative’, see Peter Butt (ed), Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 2004) 130. 
26 George T Felkenes, ‘The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality’ (1975) 7 Southwestern University Law Review 98, 
98. 
27 K Davis, Police Discretion (West Publishing, 1975) 12. 
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Whatever its origins, discretion now ‘pervades all facets of the administration of justice’.28 
While it has been accepted that a degree of discretion in decision making is required,29 these 
decisions can have a significant impact on a defendant and reverberate through every 
component of the criminal justice system.30 They can mean the difference between justice 
and injustice. Prosecutorial discretion is indeed ‘at the heart of the State’s criminal justice 
system’.31  
 
In a straightforward shoplifting incident for example, where the only offence possible is 
stealing, the Prosecutor may simply have to make a choice whether or not to proceed with 
prosecution.32 However, in more complicated matters where some force has been used in the 
commission of the offence, the Prosecutor has to decide whether to proceed with stealing, 
robbery (or possibly aggravated robbery).33 Similarly, in an altercation between individuals 
where the level of injuries suffered may vary, a number of charges may be open: a common 
assault,34 assault occasioning bodily harm,35 grievous bodily harm36 and/or wounding.37 The 
Prosecutor may select from the menu of offences which one to proceed with. The 
Prosecutor’s discretion can be said to extend to the following: the decision whether or not to 
commence or continue a prosecution, and if so, which charges should be laid, and decisions 
as to the conduct of proceedings – which witnesses to call, what material to be presented and 
a range of other decisions regarding the conduct of the case.38 
 
Some discretion must inevitably be vested in the Prosecutor. The state’s resources are finite 
and the Prosecutor performs a vital function by precluding random access to the courts and to 
their limited adjudicative resources and preserving these resources for the timely judgement 
of the matters to which the public attaches priority.39 It is in this sense that the Prosecutor, 
acting in the interests of the public, serves as guardian, protector and custodian of the 
community’s scarce resources for adjudication.40 This has been referred to as the 
‘[p]rosecutor’s intelligent use of court [and state] resources.’41 The Prosecutor is at the end of 
                                                 
28 Sidney I Lezak and Maureen Leonard, ‘The Prosecutor’s Discretion: Out of the Closet, Not Out of Control’ in 
Carl F Pinkele and William C Louthan (eds), Discretion, Justice and Democracy: A Public Policy Perspective 
(Iowa State Press, 1985) 44-5. 
29 In the United States, it has been recognized that prosecutorial discretion is a necessary aspect of the justice 
system, see United States v Armstrong, 116 S Ct 1489 (1996); Anne Bowen Poulin, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion 
and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection after United States v Armstrong’ (1997) 34 American Criminal 
Law Review 1071, 1079. 
30 Felkenes, above n 27. 
31 Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice (1969) 170. Also cited in McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279, 297, 
312 (1987). 
32 This scenario was laid out in Yeo, Morgan and Cheong above n 13, 29. 
33 For example, in Western Australia the offence of robbery encapsulates that of stealing, but includes a degree 
of violence at, during or immediately after the stealing. See Criminal Code of Western Australia ss370-1 Cf 
Criminal Code of Western Australia ss 391-2 which stipulates that a person who steals a thing and, immediately 
before or at the time of or immediately after doing so, uses or threatens to use violence to any person or property 
in order to obtain the thing stolen or to prevent or overcome resistance to its being stolen commits a robbery. 
See Criminal Code of Western Australia s 391 for ‘circumstances of aggravation’. 
34 Criminal Code of Western Australia ss 222, 313. 
35 Ibid s 317. 
36 Ibid s 297. 
37 Ibid s 301. 
38 Refshauge, above n 25; Michael Rozenes, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion in Australia Today’ (Paper delivered at 
the Australian Institute of Criminology Conference: Prosecuting Justice, Melbourne, 18-19 April 1996). 
39 Hamilton and Work, above n 19, 184. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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the day, a public servant, funded by the state and thus has a duty to ensure the efficient use of 
tax payer’s dollars and state resources.42 A degree of discretion is necessary to facilitate 
compromise and expediency in the criminal justice process.43  
 
2.5 Gate Keeper of the Criminal Justice System 
 
One would think that criminal trials, having the potential to deprive a defendant of liberty and 
indeed in some jurisdictions, life, would necessitate a stringent process before conviction, 
ideally before a jury of the defendant’s peers. This notion is however, as some would put it, a 
‘romantic view’ of the criminal law.44 In reality, most decisions are made before the matter is 
put to trial.45 This is the result of the considerable discretion afforded to the Prosecutor in the 
pre-trial decision making process. In practice, this has translated into the outcome of a 
criminal trial being heavily affected by the decisions of a Prosecutor who, in the words of 
then US Attorney General Robert Jackson, ‘has more control over life, liberty and reputation 
than any other person’.46 The term ‘gate-keeper’ of the criminal justice system is thus not an 
inaccurate label for the Prosecutor. 47 
 
Given the immense discretion a Prosecutor is given in the commencement and conduct of 
criminal proceedings and its corresponding effect on the accused, it is a strange state of 
affairs that the role of the Prosecutor is often ‘forgotten in discussions of the criminal justice 
system’. 48 As highlighted in a report by the Australian Institute of Criminology: 
 
[t]he exercise of prosecutorial discretion is one of the most important but least understood 
aspects in the administration of criminal justice. The considerable discretionary powers vested 
in prosecutors employed by the state and territory Offices of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) are exercised in accordance with prosecution policies and guidelines, but 
the decision making process is rarely subject to external scrutiny49  
                                                 
42 Vicki Waye and Paul Marcus, ‘Australia and the United States: Two Common Criminal Justice System 
Uncommonly at Odds, Part 2’ (2010) 18 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 335, 340. 
43 Mark Findlay, Criminal Law: Problems in Context (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2006) 41. 
44 F Andrew Hessick III and Reshma M Saujani, ‘Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: the Role of the 
Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel and the Judge’ (2002) Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law 189, 
189. 
45 Findlay, above n 43. 
46 Robert H Jackson, ‘The Federal Prosecutor’ (1940) 24 Journal of American Judicature Society 18. See also 
comments such as ‘no government official…has as much unreviewable power and discretion as the prosecutor’ 
in Bibas, above n 12, and ‘no government official can effect a greater influence over a citizen than the 
prosecutor who charges that citizen with a crime’ in Kenneth J Melilli, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion in an 
Adversarial System’ (1992) 3 Brigham Young University Law Review 669, 671. 
47 A phrase referred to by The Justice Committee, United Kingdom House of Commons, The Crown 
Prosecution Service: Gatekeeper of the Criminal Justice System (2009) 3. A number of commentators have also 
used the term. See Felkenes, above n 27; Federick W Gay, ‘Restorative Justice and the Prosecutor’ (2000) 27 
Fordham Urban Law Review 1651; Laurie L Levenson, ‘Workingoutside the Rules: The Undefined 
Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors’ (1999) 26 Fordham Urban law Review 553; Bennett L Gershman, ‘A 
Moral Standard for the Prosecutor’s Exercise of the Charging Decision (1993) 20 Fordham Urban Law Review 
513; Cassia Spohn and David Holleran, ‘Prosecuting Sexual Assault: A Comparison of Charging Decisions in 
Sexual Assault Cases Involving Strangers, Acquaintances and Intimate Partners’ (2001) 18 Justice Quarterly 
651; James C Backstrom, ‘The Role of the Prosecutor in Juvenile Justice: Advocacy in the Courtroom and 
Leadership in the Community’ (1999) 50 South Carolina Law Review 699. 
48 Hamilton and Work, above n 19. 
49 Denise Lievore, ‘Victim Credibility in Adult Sexual Assault Cases’ [2004] (288) Trends and Issues in Crime 
and Criminal Justice 1. 
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Grosman notes that little is known about the powers exercised by Prosecutors and the factors 
which influence their exercise of discretion.50 Legislative provisions which define the 
powers, duties and functions of the Prosecutor are significantly absent.51 Judicial 
pronouncements, if any, are largely confined to the Prosecutor’s behavior in the courtroom.52 
This trend, acknowledged by Sallmann and Willis, is a disturbing situation in any society 
which purports to embrace liberal, democratic principles and ideas.53 However, in order to 
better understand the nature of the Prosecutor and the independence or lack thereof, of the 
exercise of that office’s discretion, it is first useful to look at the development of the 
prosecution service and how it arrived in its current form. 
 
3. The Prosecution System Illustrated 
 
3.1 The Development of Prosecutions in Australia 
 
Different legal cultures have developed varying approaches in dealing with individuals who 
break the laws set down by the state and society.54 In the trial of Socrates, as depicted in ‘The 
Crito’, the decision to prosecute Socrates was made by a trio of private citizens: a politician, a 
poet and a rhetorician.55 In another well known trial four hundred years later, Pontius Pilate 
first found no basis for a charge against Jesus but later left his prosecution to a crowd. In 
various criminal justice systems today, the majority of prosecutions will be state sanctioned, 
initiated by the state ‘in the public interest’,56 with official state Prosecutors at the helm.57 In 
Japan, which does not recognize any offence unless prosecution is undertaken by the state, 
this has been described as a ‘monopolization of prosecution’.58 While some jurisdictions 
make limited provisions for private prosecutions,59 these are few and far between – the reality 
of the criminal justice system is that prosecution is an arena dominated by the state and its 
Prosecutors.60 
                                                 
50 B A Grosman, The Prosecutor (University of Toronto Press, 1969) 3. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Peter Sallmann and John Willis, Criminal Justice in Australia (Oxford University Press, 1984) 49. 
54 Mark West, ‘Prosecution Review Commissions: Japan’s Answer to the Problem of Prosecutorial Discretion’ 
(1992) 92 Colombia Law Review 684. 
55 Justin D Kaplan, Introductory Note to Dialogues of Plato 2 (Jowett trans 1950), cited in West, above n 55. 
56 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 29 January 1951, vol 483, col 681, (Sir 
Hartley Shawcross, Attorney-General). 
57 Jeremy Gans, Modern Criminal Law of Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 57. 
58 ‘The Criminal Justice System in Japan: Prosecution’ (Paper presented at the 107th International Training 
Course: The Role and Function of Prosecution in Criminal Justice, The United Nations Asia and Far East 
Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI), 1 September to 21 November 
1997) 48. 
59 In Australia for example, this is provided for by The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s13.  In Western Australia, private 
prosecution has since been discontinued – the Director of Public Prosecutions thus has full conduct of criminal 
matters in the State, see Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 27 Oct 2004, 7328 
(Second Reading Speech of the Criminal Procedure Bill 2004). In Singapore, private prosecution can be done by 
way of a Magistrate’s Complaint, see Subordinate Courts Working Paper Committee, Complaints to Magistrates 
(1999) Subordinate Courts of Singapore   
<http://www.lawnet.com.sg/legal/ln2/comm/PDF/complaints.pdf>. See also the comments of Yong CJ in Cheng 
William v Loo Ngee Long Edmund [2001] 2 SLR(R) 626 [16]. For British examples, see Richard J Stafford, 
Private Prosecutions (Shaw & Sons, 1989) 181-187; Irving R Kaufman, ‘Criminal Procedure in England and 
the United States: Comparisons in Initiating Prosecutions’ (1980) 49 Fordham Law Review 26, 28, 30 and the 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (UK), s6(1) which preserves the power to instigate private prosecutions. 
60 Gans, above n 58. 
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In Australia, prior to 1982, prosecutions were conducted along the same vein as the English 
tradition where it was private citizens and the police, acting as citizens and not 
representatives of the state, who commenced and conducted prosecutions.61 This however, 
was not ideal as private prosecutions imposed a significant burden on the private citizen 
acting as Prosecutor.62 This also led to an element of arbitrariness as whether an offender was 
ultimately prosecuted depended on the victim’s willingness to commence a prosecution. 
Thus, while the right to initiate private prosecutions remained under the Crimes Act 1914 
(Cth),63 upon the statutory establishment of a police force, the police took over the vast 
majority of prosecution of offences.64  
 
3.1.1 The Call for Separation 
 
This was, however, still unsatisfactory given that the prosecution was often undertaken by the 
police investigator without reference to or consultation with the prosecuting authority.65 The 
concept of a police prosecutor is problematic as the person who investigates the crime is seen 
as having an interest in seeing the case proceed. Also disconcerting was the fact that the 
prosecution service then was seen to be part of government, giving rise to the question of 
independence.66 The prospect of a prosecution service entirely independent of the 
government and the police was rare, but one that has been described as being ‘eminently 
sensible if one wanted to remove prosecutions and prosecutorial decisions from the political 
process.’67 Some saw a need to remove the Attorney-General (who until that time was 
responsible for the commencement and conduct of prosecutions), an elected member of the 
legislature, from the prosecution process to ensure true independence from the day to day 
politics of government.68 As noted by John Coldrey: 
 
[A]  major  problem exists  when the  prosecutorial discretion  must  be  exercised  in  
controversial  or  politically sensitive circumstances. There is a real potential that such 
decisions will  become subject to  distortion  or  misconstruction  if  they  are  drawn  into  the  
ambit  of  party political debate or alternatively, will be perceived as having been motivated 
                                                 
61 According to Williams, ‘[p]rosecution by private people was frequent and important before the advent of the 
modern police forces, in periods when it could be asserted that prosecuting for criminal offences was the 
patriotic duty of all citizens’ see D G Williams, ‘Prosecution, Discretion and the Accountability of the Police’ in 
R Hood (ed) Crime Criminology and Public Policy 32 cited in Justin McCarthy, ‘ Towards a Public Prosecution 
System in Australia’ (Paper presented at the International Society for the Reform of the Criminal Law 
Conference: Investigating Crime and Apprehending Suspects: Police Powers and Citizens Rights, Sydney, 19-
24 March 1989) 1. 
62 Homer S Cummings and Carl McFarland, Federal Justice (1937) 13 cited in Robert L Misner, ‘Recasting 
Prosecutorial Discretion’ (1996) 86 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 717, 729. 
63 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 13. 
64 Refshauge, above n 25. 
65 Damian Bugg, ‘The Role of the DPP in the 20th Century’ (Paper presented at the Judicial Conference of 
Australia, Melbourne, 13 November 1999).  
66 G E Fitzgerald, Commission of inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct 
(1989) 238; Bugg, above n 65. 
67 Jeremy W Rapke, ‘ODPP Vic 25th Anniversary Dinner Speech’ (Speech delivered at the Office of the Director 
of Public Prosecutions (Victoria) 25th Anniversary Dinner, Parliament House, Melbourne, 27 October 2008) 
<http://www.opp.vic.gov.au/resources/2/d/2d61b900404a17b0b434fff5f2791d4a/25th_anniversary_speech_deli
vered_by_dpp-27oct08.pdf>. Similar concerns were raised in the UK, see, eg, Great Britain, Royal Commission 
on Police, Final Report (1962).  
68 Jaala Hinchcliffe, ‘A Brief History of the CDPP’ (Speech delivered at the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions 25th Anniversary Dinner, Old Parliament House, Canberra, 5 March 2001) 
<http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Director/Speeches/20090305jh-a-brief-history-of-the-CDPP.aspx>. 
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by political partisanship. It is not to the point that such assertions aid perceptions may be 
factually groundless. The damage that is created is that the necessary public confidence in the 
administration of the criminal law will be eroded.69  
 
In addition to the perceived lack of independence, the prosecution service suffered from a 
myriad of issues and was accordingly criticized: 
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s it became increasingly apparent that the Commonwealth 
prosecution process was fraught with delay and inefficiencies. Matters came to a head with 
the widespread debate concerning some of the revelations contained in the first Costigan 
Report. In particular, in that report the Royal Commissioner outlined what he described as the 
‘lamentable history of non-prosecution’ which occurred in the Perth Office of the Deputy 
Crown Solicitor in relation to a ‘bottom-of-the-harbour’ tax prosecution which came to the 
attention of the Australian Taxation Office almost a decade earlier and still required 
prosecution attention. It is also clear that in the federal sphere in recent years crime has 
become much more complex, and for that reason traditional responses have been rendered 
inappropriate.70 
 
Similarly, in a 1980 report by the Australian Law Reform Commission, it was noted that: 
 
[t]he process of prosecutions in Australia at both State and Federal level is probably the most 
secretive, least understood and most poorly documented aspect of the administration of 
criminal justice.71 
 
This remark, ‘not wide off the mark’,72 alluded to the lack of consistent, publicly available 
guidelines and policies to guide the exercise of discretion and power of the Prosecutor. The 
report recommended the establishment of policies to be adopted by Prosecutors in the 
exercise of their discretion whether or not to initiate criminal proceedings and in reviewing 
and settling charges.73 The report also recommended that such policies be made publicly 
                                                 
69 Geoffrey Flatman, ‘The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions: Independence Professionalism and 
Accountability’ (Paper presented at the Australian Institute of Criminology Conference: Prosecuting Justice, 
Independence of the Prosecutor, Melbourne, 18-19 April 1996) 2-3. 
70 Hinchcliffe, above n 68. 
71 Australian Law Reform Commission, Sentencing of Federal Offenders, Report No 15 (1980). Similarly, other 
reports that called for a transfer of prosecutions away from the Police include: Criminal Law and Penal Methods 
Reform Committee of South Australia, Second Report on Criminal Investigation (1974) 174; Lusher, above n 
101, 258; New South Wales, Royal Commission into Certain Committal proceedings against KE Humphries, 
Report (1983) 99; Independent Commission Against Corruption, Investigation into the relationship between 
Police and Criminals - Second Report (1994); G E Fitzgerald, Commission of inquiry into Possible Illegal 
Activities and Associated Police Misconduct (1989) 238, which noted that ‘[t]he employment of experienced 
police officers as Police Prosecutors absorbs resources which might be better employed on other essential 
policing duties. It is undesirable that the courts be seen as having to rely upon the Police Force to exercise 
important discretions in bringing and pursuing charges. This is made worse by any public perception that the 
Police have special standing or influence in the prosecution process. Independent, legally qualified people could 
be employed by the Director of Public Prosecutions to conduct prosecutions’; New South Wales, Royal 
Commission into the New South Wales Police Service, Final Report (1997) vol 2, 318 [3.318]; cited in Tony 
Krone, ‘Police and Prosecution’ (Paper presented at the 3rd National Outlook Symposium on Crime in Australia, 
Mapping the Boundaries of Australia’s Criminal Justice System, Australia Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 
22-23 March 1999) 11-12. See also, New South Wales Office of Public Management, ‘Transfer of certain 
prosecution functions from the police to the Director of Public Prosecutions (Report, New South Wales Office 
of Public Management,1989); A Sanders, ‘An Independent Crown Prosecution Service’ (1986) 153 The 
Criminal Law Review 16. 
72 Bugg, above n 65. 
73 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 72, [103]. 
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available to be ‘reviewed and criticized where appropriate’,74 for a restructuring of the 
charging process and for the charge bargaining system to be further examined and made more 
visible.75 These comments demonstrate the lack of a ‘minimum level’ of transparency and 
accountability that is necessary if public confidence in the criminal justice system is to be 
guaranteed. 
 
3.1.2 The Independent Prosecutor: Fair and Accountable 
 
Attempts were thus made to establish an independent prosecution service. In Tasmania, this 
was done via the Crown Advocate under the Crown Advocate Act.76 The Act however, failed 
to provide guidance on the relationship between the offices of the Crown Advocate, the 
Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General.77 Additionally, it did not allow for the Crown 
Advocate to publish or issue prosecution guidelines which would have ensured some form of 
consistency and provided guidance in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to other 
agencies with prosecution powers.78 It was only later in Victoria that the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (‘the DPP’) was born,79 with most of the Attorney-General’s functions in 
matters of criminal prosecution being transferred to that Office.80 This was later followed by 
the establishment of the Commonwealth’s Office of Director of Public Prosecutions through 
the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth).81 
 
This was followed by the remaining States each establishing their own DPP under local 
legislation.82 The Offices were endowed with powers to commence prosecutions,83 take over 
the conduct of prosecutions or terminate prosecutions,84 enter a nolle prosequi,85 but perhaps 
most importantly, addressing the issue that the Tasmania’s earlier experiment did not. The 
                                                 
74 Ibid [107]. 
75 Ibid 74 [102], 76 [123]. 
76Crown Advocate Act 1973 (Tas); Bugg, above n 65, 1-2. 
77 Refshauge, above n 25, 354; Bugg, above n 65.  
78 Refshauge, above n 25, 354. 
79 Ibid. John Harber Phillips was appointed as the first Director of Public Prosecutions for Victoria, see Rapke, 
above n 67.  
80 Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1982 (Vic). 
81 Refshauge, above n 25, 355. Ian Temby was the inaugal Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. 
82 Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1990 (NT); Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1986 (NSW); Director of 
Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (SA); Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (WA); Director of Public 
Prosecutions Act 1984 (Qld); Public Prosecutions Act 1994 (Vic) which replaced the Director of Public 
Prosecutions Act 1982 (Vic); see also the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1973 (Tas), being the Crown 
Advocate Act 1973 (Tas), renamed by amendment. 
83 Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) s 6(1)(a), (c), (d); Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1990 
(NT) ss 12, 13; Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1986 (NSW) s 8; Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 
(WA) ss 11(1)(a), 12(1)(a); Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1984 (Qld) s 10(1)(a); Director of Public 
Prosecutions Act 1973 (Tas) s 12(1)(a)(i); Public Prosecutions Act 1994(Vic) s 22(1); Director of Public 
Prosecutions Act 1991 (SA) s 7(1)(i). 
84 Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) s9(5); Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1990 (NT) ss 
13(b), (c); Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1986 (NSW) s 9; Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 
(WA) ss 11(1)(b), 12(1)(b); Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1984 (Qld) s 10(1)(c)(ii); Director of Public 
Prosecutions Act 1982 (Vic) s 22(1)(b)(ii); Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1973 (Tas) s 12(1)(a)(ii); 
Notably, the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (SA) gives no express provision but relies on the 
incidental power of the act s 7(1)(i). 
85 ‘Declining to proceed’. Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) s 9(4); Criminal Code Act  (NT) ss 
297A, 302; Criminal Code (WA) s 581; Criminal Code (Qld) s 563; Public Prosecutions Act 1994 (Vic) s 25; 
Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1973 (Tas) s 16; Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (SA) s 7(1)(e); 
Notably, in NSW there is not statutory equivalent, but the inherent power may be found under general law per R 
v Jell; Ex Parte Attorney-General (Qld) [1991] 1 Qd R 48, 57-59. 
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Acts allowed the DPPs to publish guidelines and to give directions to other prosecuting 
officials.86 This laid the foundation for an independent prosecution service exercising 
consistency and transparency in the course of its duties, not least of all in the exercise of their 
prosecutorial discretion. The objective of establishing the Office of the DPP can be seen in a 
comment made by Kirby P:  
 
What is the object of having a Director of Public Prosecutions? Obviously it is to ensure that a 
high degree of independence in the vital task of making prosecution decisions in exercising 
prosecution discretion… Decisions to commence, not to commence or to terminate a 
prosecution are made independently of the courts. Yet they can have the greatest 
consequences for the application of the criminal law. It was to ensure that in certain cases 
manifest integrity and neutrality were brought to bear upon the prosecutorial decisions that 
the Act was passed by Parliament affording large and important powers to the DPP who, by 
the Act, was given a very high measure of independence.87  
 
Kirby’s comment referred to the political independence (or lack thereof) of the prosecution 
service and the desire for a less ‘secretive, poorly understood’88 process in prosecution, given 
the impact the exercise of prosecutorial decision has on stakeholders within the criminal 
justice system. These factors thus culminated in the Office of the DPP with the notion that the 
conduct of prosecutions in Australia would be independent, fair and accountable.89 
 
3.1.3 The Hybrid System: A Compromise? 
 
Despite the historical developments outlined above depicting a clear desire for an 
independent and impartial prosecution services, legally qualified practitioners employed by 
the Office of the DPP are only deployed in serious matters, before superior courts.90 In minor 
matters such as thefts, drink driving and minor assaults before the lower courts, the majority 
of prosecutions are still being conducted by police prosecutors,91 who may have some 
training in law and advocacy,92 but need not necessarily be legally qualified.93  
                                                 
86 Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) ss7, 11; Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1990 (NT) ss 
24(b), 25; Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1986 (NSW) ss 13, 16; Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 
(WA) ss 23, 24; Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1984 (Qld) ss 11(1)(b), (b); Public Prosecutions Act 1994 
(Vic) ss 26, 27; Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1973 (Tas) s 16; Notably, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions Act 1991 (SA) gives no express provision but relies on the incidental power of the Act s 7(1)(i). 
87 Price v Ferris (1994) 34 NSWLR 704, 708 (Kirby P). Kirby P also made reference to the Australian Law 
Reform Commission, Sentencing of Federal Offenders, Report No 15 (1980) in his remarks. 
88 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 72, 61. 
89 Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth (2008) 
<http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Publications/ProsecutionPolicy/ProsecutionPolicy.pdf>; Bugg, above n 65; John 
McKechnie, ‘Directors of Public Prosecutions: Independent and Accountable’ (1996) 26 University of Western 
Australia Law Review 266. See the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) Bill Second Reading Speech, ‘The 
high status of the Director’s position, and the security of tenure provided, will ensure that the Director is freed 
from any suggestion or appearance that he or she is open to political pressure. There will be no reason to fear 
that the Director may make decisions to curry favour with the Government of the day, in order to secure 
reappointment or advancement’, New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 1 December 
1986, 7343 (Terence Sheahan). 
90 Waye and Marcus, above n 43, 346. See Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth); Director of Public 
Prosecutions Act 1986 (NSW); Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (NT); Director of Public Prosecutions 
Act 1991 (SA); Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (WA); Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1994 
(Vic); Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1973 (Tas). See also Colvin and McKechnie, above n 10, 694. 
91 Except for the Australian Capital Territory. Refshauge, above n 25, 356; Waye and Marcus, above n 43, 347; 
Harvey, above n 6. 
92 J Hunter, C Cameron and T Henning, Litigation Volume II: Evidence and Criminal Process (LexisNexis, 7th 
ed, 2005) 716. 
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Commentators have noted the oddity of this system,94 citing several obvious inherent 
weaknesses. The paralegal police prosecutor, not legally qualified, is not subject to the ethical 
standards that govern those admitted to the bar.95 Similarly, as non-legal practitioners, they 
are unable to claim professional privilege over their communications.96 Furthermore, 
prosecutorial functions risk being tainted by corruption that has on occasion, surfaced within 
the police service.97 Additionally, the issue of competence and training can be called into 
question. While some measures have been taken to ensure competency in prosecution at 
trial,98 the training currently provided for the police prosecutor is inadequate and only allows 
a few weeks to learn the fundamentals of prosecuting and the legal system, with much of the 
work to be learned on-the-job.99  
 
The question of independence has also not been resolved. As the Lusher report notes,100 even 
if police prosecutors were legally qualified, it would still be inappropriate for them to conduct 
prosecutions as it breaches the principle of independence.101 By combining the functions of 
policing, investigation and prosecution, it becomes harder to dispel the belief that everyone 
who is apprehended by the police for a criminal offence will be prosecuted.102 The concern 
here is as much with impartiality as the appearance of impartiality,103 which is greatly 
diminished if the police continue to have a role in the conduct of prosecutions. 
 
While it was envisioned that the respective DPPs would have broad powers over 
prosecutions, these were not without limit. Initially in Western Australia, the wording of 
section 12 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (WA) made no provision that 
permitted the DPP to conduct summary prosecutions, leaving this area exclusively to the 
police. This has since been amended by inserting section 11 to allow the DPP to commence 
and conduct the prosecution of any offence, whether indictable or not.104 
                                                                                                                                                        
93 Refshauge, above n 25, 356. 
94 Duncan Chappell and Paul Wilson, The Australian Criminal Justice System: The Mid 1980s (Butterworths: 
1986) 1-17; Waye and Marcus, above n 43, 347. 
95 Waye and Marcus, above n 43, 347; New South Wales, Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police, 
Final Report (1997) vol 2. 
96 Waye and Marcus, above n 43, 347. This article of course, is not the place for a lengthy discussion on legal 
professional privilege. 
97 See especially Independent Commission Against Corruption, Investigation into the relationship between 
Police and Criminals - Second Report (1994), 112, which outlines one case where a police prosecutor accepted 
money to withhold a defendant’s true criminal record. 
98 Ken Drew, ‘The New South Wales Police Prosecutor’, in Julia Vernon and Francis Regan (eds) Improving 
Access to Justice: The Future of Paralegal Professionals (Australian Institute of Criminology, 1992) 103, 105 
for a list of measures, including in-house training methodologies and database of case law digests made 
available for the police prosecutor. 
99 John Murray, The Paralegal Police Prosecutor – For How Long? in Julia Vernon and Francis Regan (eds) 
Improving Access to Justice: The Future of Paralegal Professionals 105 (Australian Institute of Criminology, 
1992) 98. 
100 E A Lusher, Commission to Inquire into New South Wales Police Administration (1988) 255-256. 
101 Chris Corns, ‘Police Summary Prosecutions: The Past, Present and Future’ (Paper presented at the Australian 
Institute of Criminology History of Crime, Policing and Punishment Conference, Charles Stuart University, 
Canberra, 9-10 December 1999) 10.  
102 Peter Sweeny, ‘The Role of the Police Prosecutor in the Magistrates Court System’ in Ivan Potasa (ed) 
Prosecutorial Discretion (Australian Institute of Criminology, Seminar Proceedings No 6, 1984) 135, 143 cited 
in Krone, above n 72, 4. 
103 New South Wales, Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police, Interim Report (1996) 127; Corns, 
above n 102. 
104 Explanatory Memorandum, Director of Public Prosecutions Amendment Bill 2004 (WA). 
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Similarly, in Queensland, under the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1984 (Qld), 
‘criminal proceedings are defined to mean proceedings on indictment and certain proceedings 
in the Supreme Court commenced by a person charged with an indictable offence’.105 Thus, 
while the DPP is empowered to commence, institute and conduct criminal proceedings at the 
indictable level, and where necessary, take over and conduct proceedings at the summary 
level,106 these powers, as Refshauge points out, do not extend to initiating prosecutions at the 
summary level.107  
 
To the credit of the Directors of Public Prosecution, and the police, despite this ‘hybrid 
system’, the integrity and independence of the Australian prosecution service from 
governmental politics and police tampering is preserved. Unflinching prosecution of high 
profile political bribery matters helped reassure the community that prosecution was 
undertaken by officers who were not susceptible to political influence.108 For example, in 
1992, just two days after the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (WA) was passed, 
John McKechnie, the then DPP for Western Australia, initiated contempt proceedings against 
a serving Minister in the Lawrence Government.109  Additionally, McKechnie noted the 
Western Australian prosecution service has since prosecuted at least two former Premiers 
(Liberal and Labor), a former Deputy Premier and Member of Parliament, and a number of 
police officers.110 These acts, particularly so early into the new experiment of the independent 
Office, were courageous acts but proper ones that arguably set the right tone for subsequent 
years, conceiving a prosecution service ‘free from the shackles of the past and from political 
and other influences, including that of the police’.111 They demonstrated that the DPP would 
not shy away from initiating prosecutions unpopular with the government of the day. 
 
In Western Australia, the DPP operates a small team of five Prosecutors within the Police 
Prosecuting Division.112 Headed by a consultant State Prosecutor,113 the team handles a range 
of complex matters within the Magistrates Court jurisdiction.114 This is a step towards 
remedying the situation but while there have been a number of attempts to transfer the 
functions of prosecution from the police to the DPP,115 at the time of writing, a full-scale 
                                                 
105 Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1984 (Qld) s4. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Refshauge, above n 25, 356. Similarly, Refshauge also notes that the powers of the Director to direct police 
prosecutions in Victoria is somewhat limited, 357 (footnote 41). 
108 Bugg, above n 109. 
109 R v Pearce (1992) 7 WAR 395; McKechnie, above n 90, 270. 
110 McKechnie, above n 90. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (WA), Annual Report 2010/2011 
<http://www.dpp.wa.gov.au/content/DPP_Annual_Report_2011.pdf> 12. 
113 Consultant State Prosecutors are the most experienced prosecutors in the Office and are allocated the most 
complex legal matters. They report directly to the Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions. See Office of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (WA), Annual Report 2010/2011 
<http://www.dpp.wa.gov.au/content/DPP_Annual_Report_2011.pdf> 10. 
114 Ibid. 
115 In 2006 the Western Australia Police Commissioner announced a desire to move prosecution functions away 
from the police, ‘WA Commissioner wants to get rid of police prosecutors’, AAP General News Wire (Sydney), 
20 Oct 2006, 1; In 2008, Robert Cock, the DPP of WA began discussions to take over the role of the police 
prosecutors, after a successful cost neutral pilot trial in the Children’s Court, Debbie Guest, ‘WA’s Police 
Prosecutors could lose role’, The Australian, 24 Oct 2008; In 2010, Joe McGrath, upon his appointment as DPP 
of WA, announced plans to take over police prosecutions in the Magistrate’s Court, Todd Cardy, ‘Lawyers to 
Replace Police Prosecutors’, The Sunday Times, 3 April 2010. So far, none of these announcements have 
amounted to a full transfer of prosecutorial functions from the police to the DPP. 
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transfer has yet to occur. This may simply be due to a lack of resources. Michael Rozenes, the 
then Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecution, noted the restrictions on the authority of 
the DPP on the initiation and conduct of prosecutions before summary courts, further stating 
that ‘even if a DPP was minded to become involved in prosecutions before the summary 
courts, often the Office simply did not have the funds to do so’.116 As noted above, police 
prosecutors are not subject to the same professional obligations as a legal practitioner 
admitted to the bar. This, however, according to John Murray,117 has its benefits. Police 
prosecutors often undertake their high volume of work in the conduct of a trial with minimal 
or no preparation.118 Legally qualified practitioners, under their ethical obligations,119 may 
not be so inclined to do so.120 Police prosecutors are not subject to such obligations and are 
furthermore working in a quasi-military hierarchy, which allows for the direction of police 
prosecutors to undertake a high volume workload with little or no preparation.121 Murray 
estimates that a full transfer of prosecutorial functions from the police to the DPP would 
necessitate an increase of staff in the order of 4:1.122 As such, the retention of police 
prosecutors, though at the risk of prosecutions being criticized for not being impartial, is the 
result of practical necessity. 
 
4. The Displacement of Discretion 
 
4.1 Plea Bargaining 
 
While the objective of an independent, fair and accountable prosecution service is admirable 
and commendable, the practicalities of the criminal justice system also need to be considered. 
It has been estimated that for every 1000 ‘crimes’ committed, only 400 are reported to the 
police and 320 are officially recorded.123 Of these, only 64 will be cleared up, 43 persons 
convicted and only one will be imprisoned.124 Such is the reality of the criminal law – of 
potentially unlimited offences being committed, but limited time and resources allocated to 
address the issues. This arguably necessitates a degree of compromise to achieve efficiency 
and by extension, justice.  
 
                                                 
116 Rozenes, above n 39, 2-3. 
117John Murray was Chief Superintendent and Officer in Charge of the Prosecution Services of the South 
Australian Police Department. 
118 Murray, above n 100, 99. 
119 See Legal Profession Conduct Rules 2010 (WA) r 7(f)-(g) which states that ‘[a] practitioner must…not 
accept an engagement which is beyond the practitioner’s competence; and not accept an engagement unless the 
practitioner is in a position to carry out and complete the engagement diligently’. See also Legal Profession 
Conduct Rules 2010 (WA) r 6 (2) which states that ‘[a] practitioner must not engage in conduct that 
demonstrates that the practitioner is not a fit and proper person to practice law or may be prejudicial to, or 
diminish public confidence in, the administration of justice; or may bring the profession into disrepute’. Other 
States in Australia have similar provisions in their professional conduct rules. 
120 Murray, above n 100, 99 which noted that when DPP lawyers were on a guided tour of the Adelaide Police 
Prosecution Service, and upon examination of a number of briefs before police prosecutors, many opined that 
they would be reluctant to prosecute because of the limited information available. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
123 D Brown, D Farrier, S Egger, L McNamara, A Steel, Criminal Laws: Materials and Commentary on 
Criminal Law and Processes in NSW (Federation Press, 4th ed, 2006) 50. 
124 Ibid. 
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Thus, in the name of efficiency,125 the nature of our system of prosecutions can result in 
accused persons pleading guilty to charges that they were not originally charged with.126 Our 
criminal jurisprudence has accepted a system which allows an accused (in appropriate cases), 
charged with, say, murder, to agree to plead guilty to manslaughter in exchange for a reduced 
sentence.127 This can be attributed to an amendment and/or withdrawal of charges, often due 
to the ‘plea bargaining’ process between the accused and the Prosecutor.128 ‘Plea bargaining’ 
is a general description for the process by which an accused admits his guilt in exchange for 
some concessions,129 and it is here that one is able to see the great reach of prosecutorial 
discretion.130 Current literature is not always consistent in the use of the term ‘plea 
bargaining’, ‘plea discussions’, or ‘charge bargaining’.131 This issue is further compounded 
by slightly different models adopted by various legal systems.132 To reduce confusion, the 
term ‘plea bargaining’ is used in this article to refer to the process between the accused and 
the Prosecutor where a guilty plea is agreed upon in return for a charge for a lesser offence or 
a dismissal of one or more charges.133 The result is thus a mutually satisfactory disposition of 
                                                 
125 Though some say convenience or worse, sloth – is a factor that sustains plea bargaining, see John H 
Langbein, ‘Torture and Plea Bargaining’ (1978) 46 University of Chicago Law Review 3, 18-19. 
126 Sallmann and Willis, above n 53, 68. 
127 Paul Gerber, ‘When is Plea Bargaining Justified?’ (2003) 3 Queensland University of Technology Law and 
Justice Journal 211. 
128 Sallmann and Willis, above n 53, 68. 
129 Matthias Boll, Plea Bargaining and Agreement in the Criminal Process: A Comparison Between Australia, 
England and Germany (Diplomica-Verl, 2009) 1-5. Commentators have noted that an early guilty plea may 
attract a discount of up to 30% on sentence, see Mirko Bagaric and Julie Brebner, 'The Solution to the Dilemma 
Presented by the  Guilty Plea Discount: The Qualified Guilty Plea - I'm Pleading Guilty Only Because of  the 
Discount' (2002) 30 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 51; David Field, 'Plead Guilty Early and 
Convincingly to Avoid Disappointment' (2002) 14 Bond Law Review 251; Ralph Henham, 'Bargain Justice or 
Justice Denied?  Sentencing Discounts and the Criminal Process' (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 515. Australian 
case authority seems to support this with sentencing discounts that range from 20% to 35%, see Trescuri v The 
Queen [1999] WASCA 172 [25]-[26] (Anderson J); Atholwood v The Queen [1999] WASCA 256 [11] (Ipp J); 
Miles v The Queen (1997) 17 WAR 518, 520-1 (Malcolm CJ); Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339, 
351-2 (McHugh J). While it has been emphasized that the extent of the discount is a matter of judicial discretion 
with no hard and fast rule, the court can take into account public policy considerations. A fast-tracked guilty 
plea saves the court time and resources and if an offender pleads guilty at the earliest opportunity, a discount 
towards the higher end of this 20%-35% range would seem to be appropriate. In Atholwood v The Queen [1999] 
WASCA 256 [9], Ipp J also opined that a guilty plea motivated genuine remorse should be afforded a greater 
discount than a ‘bare plea’ (a plea not accompanied by genuine remorse). 
130 Waye and Marcus, above n 43, 340. 
131 See, eg, Herbert S Miller, Plea Bargaining in the United States (1978) 17 cited in Douglas D Guidorizzi, 
‘Should We Really Ban Plea Bargaining: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics’ (1998) 47 Emory Law 
Journal 753, 755, where it is noted that definition of ‘plea bargaining’ will differ depending on jurisdiction and 
the context of its use. See also, Geraldine Mackenzie, ‘The Guilty Plea Discount: Does Pragmatism Win Over 
Proportionality and Principle?’ (2007) 11 Southern Cross University Law Review 205, 218; Kathy Mack, 
'Balancing Principle and Pragmatism: Guilty Pleas' (1995) 4 Journal of Judicial Administration 232. 
132 Guidorizzi, above n 131. ‘Plea bargaining’ can also refer to the process by which the judiciary is involved to 
give some indication of the sentence that would likely be imposed in exchange for a guilty plea, though this is 
perhaps more accurately described as ‘sentence indication bargaining’ – see Peter Clark, ‘The Public Prosecutor 
and Plea Bargaining’ (1986) 60 Australian Law Journal 199; Ole Kramp, How to Deal with the Deals? The Role 
of Plea Bargaining in Australia and Germany – A Comparison (GRIN Verlag GmbH, 2009) 5; N R Cowdery, 
‘Doing the Job, Practical Prosecuting’ (Paper presented at the Australian Institute of Criminology Conference: 
Prosecuting Justice, Melbourne, 19 April 1996) 3. 
133 See Clark, above n 32, where the author notes a preference for the term ‘charge bargaining’. See also N R 
Cowdery, above n 132, 3; Kramp, above n 132, 4; R v Marshall [1981] VR 725, 732; Sallmann and Willis, 
above n 53, 74. 
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a case, subject to the court’s approval.134 In this context, the judge plays little or no role and 
is a mere ‘satellite’ to the discussions, ‘orbiting in a detached manner from the main body’.135  
 
Plea bargaining has been accepted as a necessary component of the criminal justice system in 
Australia and many other jurisdictions.136 In the United States, plea bargaining remained an 
underground practice until endorsement by the courts in Santabello v New York,137 where it 
was acknowledged that plea bargaining was an essential component of the administration of 
justice.138 The absence of plea bargaining would result in an overwhelmed system incapable 
of handling the sheer volume of criminal matters before the courts.139 In the United States, it 
is now not uncommon for more than 90% of matters to be settled by plea bargaining.140 In 
Australia, while the first prosecution policies contained prohibitions against the Prosecutor 
inviting plea negotiation dialogue with the defence,141 today, as Damian Bugg notes,142 a 
degree of informality is encouraged and Prosecutors are invited to ‘open the bidding’ in plea 
discussions.143 In Western Australia, over 90% of criminal matters are resolved summarily,144 
most without trial, usually by a guilty plea. It does not stretch the imagination to see that a 
full trial of all criminal matters would result in a drain on resources and overwhelm the 
system.145  
 
4.1.1 Advantages of Plea Bargaining 
 
                                                 
134 Waye and Marcus, above n 43, 346. 
135 Boll, above n 129. Also, as the High Court held in Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501, 513, such 
charge bargaining does not require the approval of the Court. Note that there have been some suggestions that 
plea-bargaining arrangements that are too favourable to the accused may amount to an abuse of court process, 
allowing the court to stay proceedings, see R v Brown (1989) 17 NSWLR 472 (though decided before Maxwell), 
where the Court suggested that gross undercharging could be an abuse of process, cited in Colvin and 
McKechnie, above n 9, 706. 
136 Though it should be noted that there is at least some research to suggest that certain jurisdictions such as 
Germany have resisted the plea bargaining concept, at least in principle – see John Langbein, ‘Land without 
Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It’ (1979) 78 Michigan Law Review 204. 
137 Santobello v New York, 404 US 257, 260 (1971). For a more comprehensive view of the history of plea 
bargaining in the United States, see Guidorizzi, above n 132, 763. 
138 Santobello v New York, 404 US 257, 260 (1971). 
139 John Langbein, ‘Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining’ (1979) 13 Law and Society Review 
261. 
140 United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony Sentences in State Courts 2004 
(2007) 1; See also United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Compendium of Federal 
Justice Statistics 2001 (2003) 2 which notes that ‘[t]he proportion of convicted defendants who pleaded guilty 
increased from 87% during 1990 to 95% during 2001; United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, State Court Sentencing of Convicted Felons 2000 (2003) table 4.2 which noted that 95% of felony 
convictions in state courts were achieved through guilty pleas; United States Department of Justice, Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2002 (2004) 445, table 5.57 cited in Waye and 
Marcus, above n 43, 341; Steve Colella, 'Guilty, Your Honor: The Direct and Collateral Consequences of Guilty 
Pleas and the Courts that Consistently Interpret Them' (2004) 26 Whittier Law Review 305; Mackenzie, above n 
186, 218. 
141 Damian Bugg, ‘The Role of the DPP in the 21th Century’ (Paper presented at the Heads of Prosecuting 
Agencies Conference, Quebec, 6 July 2007). 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid Cf Colvin and McKechnie, above n 9, 706 [27.38] where the authors note that it should be the accused or 
defence counsel who initiates the plea bargaining process. 
144 For example Western Australia’s percentage of guilty pleas is 92.6% in 2010-2012 according to Western 
Australian Police, Annual Report (2011) 15. 
145 In the words of Justice Burger, plea bargaining ‘is to be encouraged’ because ‘[i]f every criminal charge were 
subject to a full scale trial, the States and Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the 
number of judges and court facilities’, Santobello v New York, 404 US 257, 260 (1971). 
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Proponents of the plea bargaining system argue that it offers benefits for all stakeholders in 
the criminal justice system. The Prosecutor must allocate finite state resources over an ever 
expanding criminal docket.146 With plea bargaining, Prosecutors can summarily dispose of 
cases that are less serious, allowing them to concentrate resources on more serious offences 
(or offenders) that it would be in the public interest to prosecute to the fullest extent possible. 
The courts also benefits by preserving scarce judicial resources for more complicated and 
serious matters,147 ensuring shorter waiting times for those serious cases. An early negotiated 
guilty plea also reduces the expense of trial for parties and the court (considerable where 
there is a jury trial). Similarly, an early negotiated plea also helps victims avoid the trauma of 
a trial and the potentially psychologically damaging effects that follow,148 particularly for 
victims of sexual offences.149 Finally (and perhaps most obviously), there is also a benefit to 
the accused. Rather than endure a protracted and lengthy trial, with unpredictable outcomes, 
the criminal defendant enters into an agreement with the prosecution and receives certain 
concessions by way of sentencing and a reduction in the severity and/or the overall number of 
charges.150 
 
4.1.2 Disadvantages of Plea Bargaining 
 
The plea bargaining process raises many philosophical and ethical issues. While in principle 
the judge, despite not being a part of the negotiation between accused and the Prosecutor, is 
required to ensure that a plea of guilty by the accused to any proposed charges is entered into 
freely and voluntarily and to impose a sentence that properly reflects the criminal conduct of 
the accused, this is not always the case in practice.151 A plethora of factors may impact on the 
accused’s decision to plead guilty – the desire to avoid the social stigma that a public trial 
would bring, the desire to resolve the matter speedily, the desire for a more lenient sentence, 
or perhaps even the desire to protect co-offenders.152 These factors are not always apparent to 
the judge,153 or even if apparent, may still result in the court’s reluctance to intrude on the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.154 Additionally, while judges may theoretically reject the 
prosecution’s recommendation on sentencing, this is seldom the case in practice and more 
often than not the recommendations of the Prosecutor are simply followed,155 resulting in the 
Prosecutor essentially selecting the sentence for the court.156 This issue is also compounded 
with the advent of mandatory penalties (as will be discussed later).157  
 
 
 
                                                 
146 Waye and Marcus, above n 43, 342. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Kathy Mack and Sharyn Roach Anleu, Pleading Guilty: Issues and Practice (Australian Institute of Judicial 
Administration, 1995) 85. 
149 William F McDonald, ‘Towards a Bicentiennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return of the Victim’ 
(1976) 13 American Law Review 649, 656. 
150 Waye and Marcus, above n 43, 342. 
151 John Bishop, Prosecution without Trial (Butterworths, 1989) 200. 
152 Mackenzie, above n 186, 216; Peter Hidden, 'Some Ethical Problems for the Criminal Advocate' (2003) 27 
Criminal Law Journal 191; Bishop, above n 151; Kramp, above n 132, 7. 
153 Kramp, above n 132, 7. 
154 Bishop, above n 151. 
155 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts 
(1978) 11 cited in Bishop, above n 151. 
156 Bishop, above n 151. 
157 See page 59 of this article. 
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4.1.2.1 Fair Labeling and the Extreme Cases 
 
It is an underlying thread of the criminal law that the degrees of wrongdoing should be 
subdivided and labeled so as to represent fairly the nature and magnitude of the law-
breaking.158 This is the principle of ‘fair labeling’159 and is the voice through which the 
‘criminal law speaks to society as well as wrongdoers when it convicts them…by accurately 
naming the crime of which they are convicted’.160 With plea bargaining, the offence which 
the offender pleads guilty to may not necessarily be the one which accurately reflects the 
nature of the criminal conduct.161 Critics assert that it is criminals who benefit from the 
system by effectively ‘bargaining with the state’ and avoiding what would have been an 
appropriate sanction for their crime.162 Is it fair that a murderer may only be convicted of 
wounding or that the actions of thieves are labeled as mere attempts or possession?163 Aside 
from throwing crime statistics into chaos it risks undermining public confidence in the 
criminal justice system.164  
 
This issue is evident in several extreme, but illustrative cases. In New York for example, an 
accused was charged with first degree manslaughter but later pleaded guilty to attempted 
manslaughter in the second degree.165 The oddity was that in that particular jurisdiction, the 
crime of manslaughter does not involve intent and it would therefore be impossible to attempt 
to commit manslaughter. The New York Court of Appeals, while aware of the issue, was 
nonetheless not prepared to upset the conviction.166 In another more comical case, an accused 
pleaded guilty to ‘driving the wrong way on a one-way street’.167 There were however, no 
one-way streets in that particular community. These cases, while absurd, do highlight the 
dangers inherent in uncontrolled prosecutorial discretion.168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
158 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 5th ed, 2006) 88. See also J 
Chalmers and F Leverick, ‘Fair Labelling in Criminal law’ (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 217, 246.  
159 The principle of fair labeling can be traced back to Ashworth’s work, ‘The Elasticity of Mens Rea’ in C F H 
Tapper (ed), Crime, Proof and Punishment: Essays in Memory of Sir Rupert Cross (Butterworths, 1981) 45, 53, 
where he coined the term ‘representative labeling’. This was later further developed by in G Williams, 
‘Convictions and Fair Labelling’ (1983) 42 Cambridge Law Journal 85 stating that fair labelling was a better 
term chiefly because ‘representative’ can also refer to the few standing for the many. 
160 A P Simester and G R Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (Hart, 3rd ed, 2007) 30. 
161 Chalmers and Leverick, above n 215, (note 131). It has also been noted elsewhere that ‘the criminal law is 
arguably the most direct expression of the relationship between a State and its cirizens’, see Law Commission 
for England and Wales, Criminal Law: A Criminal Code For England and Wales Vol 1 (Law Com No 177, 
1989, 5). 
162 Guidorizzi, above n 132, 768. See also J Badgery-Parker, ‘The Criminal Process in Transition: Balancing 
Principle and Pragmatism II’ (1995) Australian Journal of Judicial Administration 193, 210-216. 
163 Boll, above n 129, 31. 
164 Langbein, above n 139, 16-17; James Edward Bond, Plea bargaining and Guilty Pleas (Boardman, 1975) 53; 
Matthias Boll, Plea Bargaining and Agreement in the Criminal Process: A Comparison Between Australia, 
England and Germany (Diplomica-Verl, 2009) 31. 
165 People v Foster, 278 NYS 2d 603 (1967), taken from A Davis, ‘Sentences for Sale: A Look at Plea 
Bargaining in England and America [1931] Criminal Law Review 150, 218, 220 and Bishop, above n 151, 201. 
166 Ibid. 
167 D J Newman, Conviction (1996) 101; Bishop, above n 151, 201; Boll, above n 129, 31. 
168 Bishop, above n 151, 201. 
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4.1.2.2 The Dissatisfied Victim 
 
The role of the victim sometimes takes a backseat in our criminal process.169 McDonald notes 
that ‘while the victim is allowed to decide what shall be done with the case as a civil 
matter…the criminal case belongs solely to the State.’170 This is derived from the notion that 
crime is perceived as an offence against not just the individual, but society,171 and is 
accordingly a matter for the state. As argued above,172 there are circumstances where it may 
be in the interests of the victim to avoid trial. Conversely, there are situations where the 
victim may prefer to go to court and testify if the alternative is the accused receiving a lesser 
charge (and consequently, a lesser sentence).173 
 
Plea bargaining deprives the victim of this option. While a victim’s view may be considered, 
this varies with the individual Prosecutor.174 Ultimately, if the decision is made to enter into a 
plea bargaining arrangement with the accused, there may be a feeling of dissatisfaction by the 
victim that the offender has ‘gotten away’ with a lenient sentence.175 While the advantages of 
plea bargaining focus on the resource implications for the system as a whole, the individual 
victim is only focused on their particular case. Plea bargaining potentially leaves victims 
dissatisfied with the criminal justice system leading to diminished public confidence in the 
process.176 
 
4.1.3 Prosecutor-Adjudicator: The Prosecutor’s Power in the Pre-Trial Decision 
Making Process 
 
The great reach of prosecutorial discretion is prominently seen in the plea bargaining 
process.177 Prosecutors are given great leeway in plea bargaining178 as they and they alone 
                                                 
169 See comments such as ‘Victims remain on the outside looking in, rather than being engaged as direct and 
active decision makers’ in Law Commission of Canada, From Restorative Justice to Transformative Justice, 
Paper for the Law Commission of Canada (1999) 18. Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal 
Process (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2005) 49; McDonald describes the victim as the ‘forgotten man’ of 
the criminal justice system in McDonald, above n 149, 650. See also, H Fenwick, 'Procedural Rights of Victims 
of Crime: Public or Private Ordering of the Criminal Justice Process' (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 317. 
170 See for example Michael O’Connell, ‘Evolving Mechamisms for Engaging Victims in the Sentencing 
Process: Should Victims Have a Stronger Voice in Court’ (Paper presented at the Sentencing Conference: 
Principles, Perspectives and Possibilities, National Judicial College of Australia, Canberra, 10-12 February 
2006); McDonald, above n 149, 650. 
171 McDonald notes that the transformation of the victim from a central to peripheral actor can be attributed to 
(1) the advent of the great experiment in corrections and rehabilitations; (2) the growth of the office of public 
prosecutor and (3) the creation of a modern police force. While McDonald is referring to these factors in the 
American social and historical setting, the Australian story is not dissimilar – as explained earlier in this paper, 
Australia moved away from the initial system of private prosecutions with the introduction of a professional 
police force and prosecution service. 
172 See page 33 of this article. 
173 Mack and Anleu, above n 205; Henham, above n 129, 537. 
174 Though interestingly, there have been suggestions that victim participation in the plea bargaining process 
might help legitimize it in the public perception, see Sarah Welling, ‘Victim Participation in Plea Bargaining’ 
(1987) 65 Washington University Law Quarterly 301, 309 (note 31). 
175 Guidorizzi, above n 132, 770. 
176 This brings up a host of other issues - public dissatisfaction may in turn influence citizens’ willingness to 
comply with the law and result in vigilante justice, see Timothy J Flanagan, Edmund F McGarrell and Edward J 
Brown, ‘Public Perception of the Criminal Courts: The Role of Demographic and Related Attitudinal Variables’ 
(1985) 22(1) Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 66, 68; Catherine Kaukinen and Sandra 
Colavecchia, ‘Public Perception of the Courts: An examination of attitudes toward the treatment of victims and 
accused’ (1999) 41 Canadian Journal of Criminology 365, 367. 
177 Waye and Marcus, above n 43, 340. 
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determine which charges to lay against the accused,179 whether they will make or accept a 
plea bargain offer or even if all charges should be dismissed.180 An accused’s acceptance of a 
lesser plea does not require the approval of the court.181 This has resulted in the prosecution’s 
role being one of the most important in the pre-trial decision-making process.182 The court 
has little or no opportunity to intervene in the pre-trial decision making process.183 Its task is 
limited to passing sentence after the charge bargaining arrangements have been concluded 
and the accused has pleaded guilty to the respective charges.184  
 
Plea bargaining puts the Prosecutor centre stage in criminal administration and forms a vital 
component of the massive and powerful reservoir of prosecutorial discretion.185 Arguably, the 
plea bargaining system places too much power into the hands of the prosecution.186 
Commentators have referred to this enormous discretion, done without judicial oversight, as 
‘prosecutorial adjudication’.187 It has been contended that  
 
with trials in open court and deserved sentences imposed by a neutral fact finder, we protect 
the due process right to an adversarial trial, minimize the risk of unjust conviction of the 
innocent, and at the same time further the public interest in effective law enforcement and 
adequate punishment of the guilty…plea negotiations simultaneously undercuts all of these 
interests. 188 
 
This has caused some to call for its abolition.189 Indeed, the wide range of powers the 
Prosecutor has in the conduct of prosecutions provides a degree of leverage. Critics have 
noted that in some circumstances,190 the daunting penalties that a defendant faces if convicted 
in court can result in the innocent defendant pleading guilty.191 Risk adverse defendants (even 
if innocent),192 when faced with the choice of pleading guilty weighed against the harsh 
penalties if convicted at trial, may well choose to plead guilty.193 The forum for the 
                                                                                                                                                        
178 Stanley Yeo, Mark Findlay and Stephen Odgers, Australian Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 3rd 
edition, 2005) 123. 
179 GAS and SJK v The Queen (2004) 78 ALJR 768, 793. 
180 Rebecca Krauss, ‘The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and Development’ (2009) 
6(1) Seton Hall Circuit Review 1, 8. 
181 R v Andrew Foster Brown (1989) 17 NSWLR 472, 480. Even if there may be evidence before the judge in 
supporting a more serious charge, see Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501; Findlay, above n 178, 111. 
182 Kramp, above n 132, 6. 
183 Wilson and Another v McCormack [1968] Tas SR 55, 61. 
184 Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501. 
185 Sallmann and Willis, above n 54, 76. 
186 Langbein, above n 139. 
187 Krauss, above n 237; Maximo Langer, ‘Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of 
Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure’ (2006) 33 American Journal of Criminal Law 223; 
Langbein, above n 139. 
188 Stephen J Schulhofer, ‘Plea Bargaining as Disaster’ (1992) 101 Yale Law Journal 1979, 2009. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Guidorizzi, above n 132, 771. 
191 Thomas Church, ‘In Defense of Bargain Justice’ (1979) 13 Law and Society Review 509, 514-515; Herbert 
Packer, The Limits of Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, 1968) 116-117.  See also Russell D Covey, 
‘Signaling and Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem’ (2009) 66 Washington and Lee Law Review 73. 
192 There may be a number of reasons why an innocent defendant may wish to plead guilty. This can include the 
desire to get the matter done and over with, or a desire to conceal other conduct which a trial may disclose, see 
Mackenzie, above n 187. 
193 Robert Scott and William Stunz, ‘A Reply: Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent Defendants’ 
(1992) 101 Yale Law Journal 2011, 2012. 
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determination of an individual’s liberty thus shifts from open court to the offices of the 
Prosecutor, giving him power of both judge and Prosecutor.194 
 
As highlighted, one can begin to comprehend the immense scope and reach that the 
prosecutorial discretion affords. This is however, not the end of the story. It has it seems 
become somewhat fashionable for legislatures throughout the world to concentrate discretion 
that should, in an ideal system, be properly vested in other branches of government, into the 
executive office of the Prosecutor. Broadly defined offences, overlapping provisions in the 
criminal codes and a fondness for mandatory sentencing have worked to expand the authority 
of the Prosecutor.195  
 
4.2 Overcriminalization and Broadly Defined Statutes 
 
Legislators enact broad criminal statutes capable of nondiscriminatory application.196 It then 
falls to the police and prosecution to identify and select a manageable number of cases to 
prosecute.197 Given that criminal conduct is described in general terms, ‘sweep[ing] together 
similar acts by markedly different actors amid infinitely variable circumstances, the exercise 
of discretion allows for the law to exempt those for whom criminal prosecution is neither 
appropriate nor necessary’.198 This discretion is also seen as necessary as public attitudes 
change over time and it is not always immediately possible for the legislature to make the 
necessary amendments. To some extent, prosecutorial discretion also functions as an informal 
means of ‘testing’ public reaction which may lead to subsequent legislative amendments on 
the issue.199 
 
The problem arises when legislators become overzealous in promulgating more criminal laws 
than the Executive has resources to enforce.200 Indeed, if one takes into account the politics of 
the criminal law, legislators, as elected representatives of the people, are often tempted by the 
conventional wisdom that appearing tough on crime is one way of garnering popularity 
amongst the electorate.201 This has subsequently resulted in a myriad of new offences and 
enhanced penalties as ‘publicity stunts’ designed to win support and elections.202  
 
Commentators have noted that statutory criminal codes contain so many overlapping 
provisions that the choice of how to characterize conduct as criminal has passed to the 
Prosecutor.203 One of the dangers of these overly broad statutes is that they can be utilized by 
the prosecution for ‘posturing’ during the plea bargaining process.204 Indeed, as Dervan 
argues, there is a ‘symbiotic relationship’ between overcriminalisation and plea bargaining – 
                                                 
194 Abraham Goldstein, The Passive Judiciary: Prosecutorial Discretion and the Guilty Plea (Louisiana State 
University Press, 1981) 3-5. 
195 Misner, above n 63. 
196 Poulin, above n 30. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Teslik W Randolf, Prosecutorial Discretion: the decision to charge: An Annotated Bibliography (National 
Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1975) 7. 
199 Abrams Norman, ‘Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion’ (1971) 19 University of 
California Law Review 1, 3. 
200 Poulin, above n 30, 1081. 
201 Erik Luna, ‘The Overcriminalization Phenomenon’ (2005) 54 American University Law Review 703, 719. 
202 Ibid 720. 
203 Misner above n 63, 742. 
204 Lucian E Dervan, ‘Overcriminalization 2.0: The Symbiotic Relationship Between Plea Bargaining and 
Overcriminalization’ (2011) 7 Journal of Law Economics and Policy 645, 653.  
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both he contends, rely on each other for their very existence in the criminal justice system.205 
Expanding statutory offences only provides more ‘items on a menu from which the 
Prosecutor may order as she [sic] wishes’.206  
 
In Western Australia, the Criminal Property Confiscation Act gives the State a wide scope to 
seize property that is the proceeds of crime or property that has been unlawfully obtained.207 
The Act is also notable for its reversal of the onus of proof,208 requiring suspects to prove that 
their wealth was lawfully obtained and its unlimited retrospectivity.209 The Attorney-General, 
Jim McGinty acknowledged when introducing the Act that it ‘is being cast far broader than 
ever could be intended to apply’.210 Its breadth ‘means the role of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions as its controller is crucially important. [It requires] a DPP who will not use the 
power capriciously and will take into account the public interest’.211 
 
Prosecutors can also ‘negate’ possible defences raised by the accused in the framing of 
charges. For example, facts that give rise to an assault occasioning bodily harm under the 
Criminal Code212 can also fall under the category of wounding or grievous bodily harm.213 In 
the former, the defence of provocation is open to the accused, whereas the latter offences 
make no such provisions. Again, the Prosecutor is able to select from the menu of charges 
available which to proceed on. In the careful selection of charges, Prosecutors can thus 
effectively anticipate and bypass defences that may be raised.  
 
As argued, through over criminalisation and broadly defined statutes, legislatures have 
effectively abdicated public policy-making to the Prosecutor.214 This has attracted criticism 
that Prosecutors are ‘the criminal justice system’s real lawmakers’.215 
 
4.3 The Imposition of Mandatory Minimum Sentences 
 
Mandatory minimum sentences also shift discretion from the courts and places it into the 
Prosecutor’s hands. Mandatory minimum sentencing216 refers to the practice of parliament 
setting a fixed penalty for the commission of a criminal offence.217 This effectively leaves the 
                                                 
205 Ibid 645. 
206 William Stunz, ‘Plea bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow’ (2004) 117 Harvard Law 
Review 2548, 2549. 
207 Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2004 (WA). 
208 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 17 August 2000, 523 (Jim McGinty, 
Attorney-General). 
209  Ibid. 
210 Ibid 524. See also, Amanda Banks, ‘Fight Against Seizure Laws: WA Governor’, The Weekend West 
(Western Australia), 20-21 August 2011, 21; ‘Calls for Changes to Confiscation Laws’, ABC (online), 27 June 
2011 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-06-27/calls-for-changes-to-confiscation-laws/2772886>; ‘Law Society 
Labels Confiscation Laws as Draconian’, ABC (online), 14 June 2011 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-06-
14/law-society-labels-confiscation-laws-draconian/2757990> for some background on the controversy of the 
confiscation laws in Western Australia. 
211 Ibid. 
212Criminal Code of Western Australia s 317. 
213 If the injury sustained is serious enough to be classified as wounding of grievous bodily harm, see Criminal 
Code of Western Australia s ss 301 and 207 for the offences of wounding and grievous bodily harm, 
respectively. 
214 Misner, above n 63, 746. 
215 William Stunz, ‘The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law’ (2001) 100 Michigan Law Review 505, 506.  
216 Sometimes referred to as ‘mandatory minimum penalties’ or ‘mandatory penalties’. 
217 Declan Roche, ‘Mandatory Sentencing’ [1999] (138) Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 1. 
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court with only one (or rather no) option upon sentencing.218 With mandatory minimum 
sentencing, the choice of charge laid has a profound and direct impact on sentence. The same 
reasons that give rise to over criminalisation can also be found in mandatory minimum 
sentencing – politicians are eager to be seen as tough on crime.219 Mandatory sentencing 
dates as far back as 1790 in the United States,220 and in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century in England.221 The 1990s witnessed a number of varying jurisdictions across the 
common law world increasing the number of mandatory sentencing laws.222 Canada began 
passing a record number of mandatory sentencing laws from 1982223 and by 1999, the 
Criminal Code of Canada contained 29 offences carrying mandatory sentences.224 The 
United States has enacted a myriad of mandatory sentencing laws relating to aggravated rape, 
drug felonies, felonies involving firearms and felonies committed by previously convicted 
felons.225 Singapore is also no stranger to mandatory minimum sentencing having inherited 
fixed sentencing from the Indian Penal Code.226 Mandatory sentencing was later expanded 
for crimes under a number of statutes227 and the Penal Code (Amendment) Act 1984 provided 
for the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences for a range of offences including 
robbery, housebreaking, vehicle theft, extortion, aggravated outrage of modesty, and rape (if 
certain circumstances are made out).228 
 
In 1996 Western Australia229 adopted mandatory minimum sentencing for property offences 
in response to a ‘moral panic’ due to a number of home invasions and the perceived 
                                                 
218 Neil Morgan, ‘Capturing Crims or Capturing Votes? The Aims and Effects of Mandatories’ (1999) 22 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 267, 267. 
219 Ibid. There are also a number of arguments in favour of mandatory minimum sentencing: selective 
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and disadvantages of mandatory minimum sentencing is best left for another article. 
220 Thomas Gabor and Nicole Crutcher, ‘Mandatory Minimum Penalties: Their Effects on Crime, Sentencing 
Disparities and Justice System Expenditures’ (Research Report, Department of Justice Canada, 2001) 1. 
221 Kate Warner, ‘Mandatory Sentencing and the Role of the Academic’ (2007) 18 Criminal Law Forum 323. 
222 Morgan, above n 218. 
223 Julian Roberts, ‘Public Opinion and Mandatory Sentencing, A Review of the International Findings’ (2003) 
30 Criminal Justice and Behavior 483, 485. 
224 Gabor and Crutcher, above n 286, annex A; Criminal Code of Canada RSC 1985, c C-46. 
225 Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters (Oxford University Press, 1996) 146. 
226 Palakrishnan, ‘Mandatory Sentences and Judicial Discretion in Criminal Law: Throwing Away the Key?’ 
(Paper presented at the LawAsia Conference, Christchurch, New Zealand, 6 October 2001) 5. 
227 Including the Arms Offences Act (Singapore, cap 14, rev ed 2008), Misuse of Drugs Act (Singapore, cap 185, 
rev ed 2008), Immigration Act (Singapore, cap 133 rev ed 2008), Vandalism Act (Singapore, cap 341, rev ed 
1985), Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act (Singapore, cap 184, rev ed 1997), 
Undesirable Publications Act (Singapore, cap 338, rev ed 1988), Internal Security Act (Singapore, cap 143, rev 
ed 1985), Banishment Act (Singapore, cap 18, rev ed 1985), Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (Singapore, 
cap 167A, rev ed 2001), Environmental Public Health Act (Singapore, cap 95, rev ed 2002), see Ross 
Worthington, ‘Between Hermes and Themis: An Empirical Study of the Contemporary Judiciary in Singapore’ 
(2002) 28 Journal of Law and Society 490, 510. 
228 Chan Wing Cheong and Andrew Phang, The Development of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice in 
Singapore (2001) 41, to be read in conjunction with Jill Tan, ‘Book Review: The Development of Criminal Law 
and Criminal Justice in Singapore’ [2001] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 229, 230 as the latter corrects a 
number of inaccuracies in the original article. See Palakrishnan, above n 290. The respective offences are 
contained in the Penal Code (Singapore, cap 224, rev ed 2008) include robbery: s392; housebreaking: ss456, 
457; vehicle theft: s379A; extortion: s383; aggravated outrage of modesty: s354A; rape: s376(2). See also 
Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, 26 July 1984, vol 44, col 1861 for the Second Reading Speech of the Penal 
Code (Amendment) Act 1984. 
229 The earlier Western Australia attempt at mandatory sentencing through the Crime (Serious and Repeat 
Offenders) Sentencing Act 1992 (WA) was a political maneuver to ‘cling to power’ and short lived. See Morgan, 
above n 218, 269. 
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inadequacy of sentences. This resulted in the ‘three-strike rule’ which provided that an 
offender convicted for the third time for a home burglary must receive a 12 month term of 
imprisonment.230 More recently, likely due to the incident of police officer Matthew Butcher 
being assaulted and paralysed, Parliament has passed mandatory sentencing laws for persons 
convicted of assaulting police officers.231 It would seem then that the legislatures in Western 
Australia and in various other jurisdictions have taken to including mandatory minimum 
penalties in their criminal statutes in what may be a popularist approach.232 
 
The issue with mandatory minimum sentencing is that it ‘chips away’233 at the judge’s role as 
adjudicator and curtails judicial discretion in sentencing, transferring it to the prosecution.234 
Critics argue that the legislature’s demonstrated eagerness to implement mandatory 
sentencing regimes is a knee-jerk reaction perceived to be popular with the electorate. Given 
this, the argument is that this is the beginning of a ‘slippery slope’ that will eventually see a 
plethora of offences on the statute books with mandatory minimum penalties that may, in the 
most extreme scenario, see judicial discretion reduced and prosecutorial discretion reaching 
unprecedented levels. This issue is further exacerbated in jurisdictions that impose the 
mandatory death penalty.235 In such situations, the hands of the court are tied in matters of 
sentencing. It is arguable that to some extent, the power over life and death slides out of the 
judiciary, into the hands of the prosecution.  
 
This curtailing of the judiciary’s discretion may be due to a number of reasons. It may be to 
allow for greater consistency in sentencing, or it may be part of a larger political trend toward 
distrust of the courts and greater empowerment of the Prosecutor.236 For some, this shift in 
                                                 
230 See s 401(4) Criminal Code of Western Australia (emphasis added); Morgan, above n 218, 269. 
231 In 2009, the Criminal Code Amendment Bill 2008 (WA) was passed in Parliament and introduced mandatory 
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(Christian Porter, Attorney-General); Singapore: Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, 9 May 2000, vol 72, col 
151-163; Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, 16 February 1973, col 416; Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, 30 
November 1973, vol 32, col 1348 (Chua Sian Chin); Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, 26 July 1984, vol 44, 
col 1867-1870 (Chua Sian Chin); Singapore, Parliamentary Debates,  9 March 2001, vol 73, col 506-532; 
Singapore, Parliamentary Debates, 26 July 1984, vol 44, col 1863, 1959-1962 (Chua Sian Chin). The WA 
Police Union has recently suggested that mandatory sentencing is responsible for ‘backroom deals’ between the 
prosecution and the accused, see Amanda  Banks, ‘“Backroom Deals” Letting Thugs off Lightly’, The West 
Australian (Western Australia) 29 October 2012. 
233 Tan, above n 228. 
234 Becky Kohler da Cruz, Prosecutorial Discretion Under Georgia’s Two Strikes Provision: A Quantitative 
Analysis (PhD Thesis, Capella University, 2008) 8, 11; Barbara Vincent and Paul Hofer, The Consequences of 
Mandatory Minimum Prison Terms: A Summary of Recent Findings (Federal Judicial Centre, 1994) 21. 
235 The mandatory death penalty is distinguishable from the death penalty. In the latter, upon conviction, the 
Court may, in its discretion, impose the death penalty. In the former, the Courts’ hands are tied and it must, upon 
pronouncement of guilt, impose the death penalty.  
236 Jill Farrell, ‘Mandatory Minimum Firearm Penalties: A Source of Sentencing Disparity’ (2003) 5 Justice 
Research and Policy 95; Kate Stith and Jose A Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal 
Courts (University of Chicago Press, 1998); Jeffrey T Ulmer, Megan C Kurlychek and John H Kramer, 
‘Prosecutorial Discretion and the Imposition of Mandatory Minimum Sentences’ (2007) 44 Journal of Research 
in Crime and Delinquency 427; Jeffrey T Ulmer, Social Worlds of Sentencing: Court Communities Under 
Sentencing Guidelines (State University of New York Press, 1997) 16. 
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power has caused concern, while others have accepted it as a necessary state of affairs. 
Nevertheless, this shift illustrates the ‘hydraulic displacement effect’.237 The displacement 
theory proposes that discretion is inevitable,238 and in this case the discretion taken away 
from the courts merely appears elsewhere – in the Prosecutor’s office. 
 
As argued above, plea bargaining, over criminalisation, broadly defined statutes and 
mandatory minimum sentences have given Prosecutors greater leeway in the administration 
of justice. These measures have not however, come without their own costs. The expanded 
discretion afforded to Prosecutors has arguably resulted in lessened transparency and 
accountability. 
 
5. Restraints on the Prosecutor 
 
5.1 Duty to Give Reasons 
 
The body responsible for the definition of a crime, the legislature, is subject to the democratic 
process and is accountable to the electorate. Parliamentary debates are publicized and freely 
available. Similarly, the judiciary, responsible for pronouncing guilt or innocence, also has 
certain standards to hold them accountable.  Save for a few exceptions,239 court hearings are 
open to the public. Most mature and competent judicial systems have adopted the principle 
heralded by Lord Denning more than half a century ago that in order for a trial to be fair, it is 
necessary not only that a correct decision should be reached, but also that it should be seen to 
be based on reason; and that can only be seen if the decision maker states his reasons.240 This 
facilitates public accountability, public scrutiny, and public confidence in the system.241 
Additionally, in Coleman v Dunlop Limited,242 Henry LJ, in quoting Lord Donaldson MR, 
stated that ‘[h]aving to give reasons concentrates the mind wonderfully’.243  
 
The position in Australia on the duty to give reasons has been even clearer.244 Australian 
courts have moved beyond the duty to state the reasons for decisions and onto the extent of 
that obligation as was the case in Waterson v Batten.245 This principle has also been reiterated 
                                                 
237 Terance D Miethe, ‘Charging and Plea Bargaining Practices under Determinate Sentencing: An Investigation 
of the Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion’ (1989) 78 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 155. 
238 Nancy Gertner, ‘Sentencing Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly’ (2005) 57 Maine Law Review 570; 
Nancy Gertner, ‘Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A View From The Bench’ (2002) 29 Human Rights Magazine 
6, 23. 
239 For example, trials that involve juveniles/minors are usually not open to the public. 
240 Alfred Denning, The Road to Justice (Stevens, 1955) 29. See also Coleman v Dunlop Limited [1998] PIQR 
398, 403 (Henry LJ). 
241 H L Ho, ‘The Judicial Duty to Give Reasons’ [2006] 20 Legal Studies: The Journal of the Society of Legal 
Scholars 42. 
242 Coleman v Dunlop Limited [1998] PIQR 398, 403. 
243 Tramountana Armadora SA v Atlantic Shipping Co SA [1978] 2 All ER 870, 872. 
244 Though of course there are a number of exceptions, for example in interlocutory matters and where the case 
is clear and straightforward, with little contention by way of facts of legal issues, see Public Service Board of 
New South Wales v Osmond (1986) 63 ALR 559, 566. Juries also do not have to provide reasons for their 
decisions. 
245 Waterson v Batten (13 May 1988, unreported) (NSW Court of Appeal), though Kirby P did also mention that 
in certain circumstances it may be impractical and unrealistic to expect delivery of written or oral grounds of 
decisions for every case due to the sheer number of cases, allowing for some latitude in the drafting of reasons. 
There is also WA authority suggesting that while Magistrates in the lower courts should provide reasons for 
decisions, this reasoning need not be extensive due to the sheer volume of matters handled by the lower courts, 
see Garrett v Nicholson (1999) 21 WAR 226; Quinlan v Police [2007] WASC 44 [126]-[127] (Johnson J). 
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in Soulemezis v Dudley246 and Public Service Board of New South Wales v Osmond.247 The 
idea is, as was put by Rawls, that reasons for decisions that are debated, attacked and 
defended, amount to an important restraint on the decision maker’s exercise of power.248 It is 
therefore accepted that public accountability of the branches of government that plays a role 
in the criminal law process is a crucial and integral part of any legal system that aspires to 
administer justice.249 
 
It is somewhat of an oddity then that the Prosecutor has far fewer limitations and is subject to 
far less scrutiny.250 In Australia, while publicly available policies guide the conduct of 
Prosecutors in the exercise of their discretion, Prosecutors, in general, are not required to 
explain their decisions and typically do not.251 The rationale for a decision, to prosecute a 
particular case or not is rarely available and few mechanisms of review are available to the 
public.252 This is somewhat questionable as Prosecutors, though performing a very different 
role from judges, do make decisions on prosecutorial matters, and are arguably playing a 
‘quasi-judicial’ role.253 In light of this, it is possible that there would be some benefit in 
requiring the Prosecutors to give reasons for decisions. It would, in the words of Lord 
Donaldson, ‘concentrate the mind wonderfully’,254 and lead to increased care in analyzing the 
evidence and coming to a decision on whether to prosecute or not, which charges to lay and 
other prosecutorial functions.  
 
5.2 Discovery Obligations 
 
In the pursuit of truth in criminal proceedings, parties are obliged to comply with the ‘rules of 
the game’.255  
 
[S]ince it is impossible to equip both the prosecution and the defence with the same 
investigative facilities the only reasonable way to attain advance equality in access to the 
evidence is through the ‘system’, that is through a discovery procedure.256 
 
                                                 
246 Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247, 279. 
247 Public Service Board of New South Wales v Osmond (1986) 63 ALR 559, 566. 
248 J Rawls, Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1972) 133; D L Shapiro, ‘In Defence of Judicial 
Candor’ (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731, 737, cited in Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 
NSWLR 247, 258 (Kirby P). 
249 It has been noted that other government actors enjoy less power yet are subject to far more regulations than 
prosecutors are in Bibas, above n 12, 962. 
250 Though it should be noted that while there are some internal mechanisms and review, these are not widely 
known and not as transparent as they could be – for example in Western Australia, the DPP prosecutors are 
divided into workgroups, each headed by a Workgroup Coordinator who is a Senior State Prosecutor. 
Presumably, prosecutorial decisions are monitored by each Coordinator, providing for some level of 
accountability and to ensure that ‘junior prosecutors are appropriately mentored and guided’. Office of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Australia), Annual Report 2010/2011 
<http://www.dpp.wa.gov.au/content/DPP_Annual_Report_2011.pdf> 10. 
251 Gans, above n 58, 60. 
252 Ibid. In a nolle prosequi, the Prosecutor, as a matter of practice does state publicly before the court the reason 
why the prosecution is not proceeding on the matter, but this statement is notably brief and unelaborated. 
253 Krauss, above n 237; Langer, above n 244. See also page 28 of this article that describes the Prosecutor’s 
quasi-adjudicator role in plea bargaining. 
254 Tramountana Armadora SA v Atlantic Shipping Co SA [1978] 2 All ER 870, 872. 
255 V S Winslow, ‘Discovery in Criminal Cases: Disclosure by the Prosecution in Singapore and Malaysia’ 
(1989) 31 Malaya Law Review 1 . 
256 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Study Report: Discovery in Criminal Cases (Working Paper, 1974). 
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In the criminal justice system, the vast resources of the state are pitted against the individual 
defendant. Imposing disclosure obligations on the prosecution allows the accused to have 
access to the evidence relevant to his/her case.257 This ensures that the accused is aware of the 
case to be met and is able to adequately prepare their defence.258 Also, and on a more 
practical note, discovery assists in resolving non-contentious and time-consuming issues 
ahead of trial and to encourage the entering of guilty pleas at an early stage.259 
 
In the United Kingdom, there was a series of highly publicized, controversial cases in the late 
1980s and early 1990s that highlighted the importance of disclosure obligations in the 
conduct of a fair trial. ‘Kiszko’,260 the ‘Maguire Seven’,261 the ‘Taylor sisters’,262 the 
‘Birmingham Six’,263 the ‘Guildford Four’264 and ‘Judith Ward’265 all involved non-
disclosure of significant material by the prosecution which resulted in a miscarriage of 
justice. In response,266  the English courts saw an expansion of the prosecution’s disclosure 
obligations from R v Saunders,267 R v Maguire268 and culminating in R v Ward where it was 
held that any material gathered by the prosecution was capable of disclosure.269 
 
In Australia, ‘miscarriages of justice due to non-disclosure have not occurred with same 
degree of frequency nor sensationalism [so] as to cause an appellate court to act so 
decisively’.270 That has however, changed with R v Mallard.271 In Mallard, it was conceded 
by the prosecution on  appeal to the High Court that the nondisclosure of certain materials 
had breached the DPP’s Statement of Prosecution Policy and Guidelines that had been made 
and gazetted pursuant to the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (WA).272 Kirby J 
adopted the following statement as representing an accurate position of the common law in 
Australia:  
 
                                                 
257 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Procedure from Charge to Tial: Specific Problems and 
Proposals (Discussion Paper on Criminal Procedure vol 1, 1987) [4.69]. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Ibid.  
260 See R v Kiszko (1991) The Times, 18 February 1992, 5 and R v Kiszko (1978) 68 Cr App R 62 for the first 
appeal. Kiszko is a vivid example of apparent deliberate police non-disclosure. Kiszko, who had an intellectual 
disability, was convicted in relation to the sexual assault and brutal murder of a girl on the basis of questionable 
and later retracted admissions that he made in interview. However, crucial forensic evidence was withheld that 
actually showed Kiszko’s innocence. He spent 16 years in prison before his eventual release but died soon after, 
see further J Niblett, Disclosure in Criminal Proceedings (Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) 21; G Tibballs, Legal 
Blunders (Robinson, 2000) 249-254; Jonathan Rose and Steve Panter, Innocents: How Justice Failed Stefan 
Kiszko and Lesley Molseed (Fourth Estate, 1997) cited in David Plater, The Changing Role of the Modern 
Prosecutor: has the notion of the ‘Minister of Justice’ Outlived its Usefulness? (PhD Thesis, The University of 
Tasmania, 2011) 186-226.  
261 R v Maguire [1992] 1 QB 936. 
262 R v Taylor & Taylor (1994) 84 Cr App R 361. 
263 R v McIlkenny (1991) 93 Cr App R 287. 
264 R v Richardson (1989), The Times, 20 October 1989. 
265 R v Ward [1993] 1 WLR 619. 
266 As noted in Plater, above n 332, 186-226. 
267 (Unreported, Central Criminal Court, Henry J, 29 August 1989). 
268 [1992] 1 QB 936. 
269 R v Ward [1993] 1 WLR 619, 645. 
270 M Hinton, ‘Unused Material and the Prosecutor’s Duty of Disclosure’ (2001) 25 Criminal Law Journal 121, 
132. 
271 (2005) 224 CLR 125. 
272 Ibid 219. 
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The prosecution is not obliged to lead evidence which may undermine the Crown case, but 
fairness requires that material in its possession which may undermine the Crown case is 
disclosed to the defence. The prosecution is not obliged to lead the evidence of witnesses who 
are likely in its opinion to be regarded by the judge or jury as incredible or unreliable. Yet 
fairness requires that material in its possession which may cast doubt on the credibility or 
reliability of those witnesses whom it chooses to lead must be disclosed273 
 
The High Court confirmed the formal and wide duty of disclosure that the prosecution should 
comply with and that the Statement of Prosecution Policy and Guidelines served to 
complement the common law duty in this regard.274 The prosecution’s failure to meet its 
disclosure obligation may lead to an order that the conviction be quashed, as was the case in 
Mallard.275 Additionally, in Western Australia, following a number of recommendations 
(albeit many years later),276 Parliament has introduced statutory provisions that have 
strengthened the disclosure obligations.277 These disclosure obligations are also reflected in 
the DPP’s own Statement of Policy and Guidelines.278 
                                                 
273 (2005) 224 CLR 125, 153 (Kirby J); Kirby P adopted this from Lord Hope’s statement in R v Winston Brown 
[1998] AC 367, 377 (Lord Hope). 
274 R v Mallard (2005) 224 CLR 125, 150 (Kirby J). 
275  Ibid. 
276 The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Review of the Criminal and Civil Justice System in 
Western Australia, Report No 92 (1999); Robert Mazza, ‘Pre-Committal Procedures and Voluntary Criminal 
Case Conferencing in Western Australia’ (Paper presented at the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 
Criminal Justice Conference, Sydney, 7-9 September 2011).  
277 Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) ss 42, 61 and 95; See Criminal Procedure Bill 2004; Western Australia, 
Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 26 August 2004, 5722-5726 (Jim McGinty, Attorney General). 
The raising of disclosure obligations was done alongside the abolition of the Committal Hearings (Preliminary 
Hearing in WA) process. Higher disclosure obligations by the prosecution were thought to at least alleviate 
some of the concerns raised by critics that the abolition of Preliminary Hearings would bring about. A summary 
of the current system was articulated by the Court in Re Grinter; Ex parte Hall  (2004) 28 WAR 427, 471 [191] 
which noted: ‘Parliament has replaced the preliminary hearing…The transfer of power over prosecution 
decisions before trial is complete. The role of the grand jury and committing magistrate has been entirely 
replaced by the functions of the Director of Public Prosecutions and a statutory duty of disclosure’. 
278 See Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (WA), Statement of Prosecution Policy and Guidelines 
(1999) <http://www.dpp.wa.gov.au/content/statement_prosecution_policy2005.pdf> [101]-[118]. The ODPP in 
other states have similar provisions:  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (SA), Prosecution Policy (1999) 
<http://www.dpp.sa.gov.au/03/prosecution_policy_guidelines.pdf>;  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic), Prosecutorial Guidelines (1993) 
<http://www.opp.vic.gov.au/getattachment/c19fca74-1629-41df-a13c-9e017aabd79d/2-The-Prosecutorial-
Discretion.aspx>;  
 Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld), Statement of Prosecution Policy and Guidelines (1995) 
<http://www.justice.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0015/16701/Directors-guidelines.pdf> 39-43;  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NT), Guidelines and Exercise of General Prosecutorial 
Discretion (1991) < http://www.nt.gov.au/justice/dpp/html/guidelines.html>;  
 [8.1]-[8.18];  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW), Office of Director of Public Prosecutions Guidelines 
(2007)  
<http://www.odpp.nsw.gov.au/guidelines/DPP%20Guidelines_whole_document_current%20to%2031_dec_201
0.pdf> 30-32; 
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT), Prosecution Policy and Guidelines of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions (1991)  
<http://www.dpp.act.gov.au/about_the_dpp/the_prosecution_policy>;  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas), Director of Public Prosecution Guidelines (1994) 
<http://www.crownlaw.tas.gov.au/dpp/prosecution_guidelines>;  
<http://www.odpp.nsw.gov.au/guidelines/DPP%20Guidelines_whole_document_current%20to%2031_dec_201
0.pdf>. 
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5.3 Judicial Review 
 
Australia has evinced a general reluctance to interfere with functions of prosecutorial 
discretion. Australian courts do not purport to exercise control over the commencement or 
continuation of criminal proceedings, save where it is necessary to prevent an abuse of 
process or to ensure a fair trial.279 In a number of cases, the courts have confirmed the 
position that the decision whether or not to prosecute a case is not susceptible to judicial 
review.280 This stems from R v Maxwell where the High Court held that certain decisions 
involved in the prosecution process are, of their nature, insusceptible of judicial review.281 
They include decisions whether or not to prosecute,282 to enter a nolle prosequi,283 to proceed 
ex officio,284 whether or not to present evidence285 and decisions as to the particular charge to 
be laid or prosecuted.286 As observed in Maxwell: 
 
The integrity of the judicial process — particularly, its independence and impartiality and the 
public perception thereof — would be compromised if the courts were to decide or were to be 
in any way concerned with decisions as to who is to be prosecuted and for what.287  
 
Similarly, the selection of the appropriate charges to proceed with is a matter with which the 
court will not usually interfere with.288 This position may even extend (as is notoriously 
common in drug offences) to decisions to particularize in the charge the amount of a 
prohibited drug as this is a matter for prosecutorial discretion. In Matthews v Greene, the 
Court held that ‘it may be that, as with the choice of a charge, the exercise of this 
prosecutorial discretion will be a matter with which courts are reluctant to intervene’.289  
 
The court can, however, in limited circumstances where the bringing of criminal proceedings 
are oppressive and an abuse of process, embark upon a preliminary enquiry and stay 
proceedings.290 It should however be emphasized that this power stems from the court’s 
                                                 
279 Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75, 90-1, 96. 
280 Ibid 94; R v Jewitt [1985] 2 SCR 128 , 139–140. 
Hanna v Director of Public Prosecutions [2005] NSWSC 134 [40]. It is also difficult to get a mandamus against 
anybody with prosecutorial or quasi-prosecutorial functions or powers  to force it to take action, see Hannes 
Schoombee and Lee McIntosh, ‘Watching over the Watch-Dogs: Regulatory Theory and Practice, with 
Particular Reference to Environmental Regulation’ (Paper presented at the Australian Institute of Administrative 
Laws Annual Conference, 4-5 July 2002).  
281 Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501. 
282 Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254, 1277; Director of Public Prosecutions v 
Humphrys [1977] AC 1, 46; Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75, 94-5, 110. 
283  R v Allen (1862) ER 929; Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75, 90-1. 
284 Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75, 92-3, 104, 107, 109. 
285 R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563, 575. 
286 R v McCready (1985) 20 A Crim R 32, 39; Chow v Director of Public Prosecutions (1992) 28 NSWLR 
593, 604-5 cited in Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501 (emphasis added). 
287 Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501, 534. 
288 Chung v The Queen (2007) 175 A Crim R 579, 589–591. 
289 Ibid [54]-[61] (Spigelman CJ); Matthews v Greene (2011) WASC 258 [68]. 
290 R v Bow Street Magistrates; Ex parte Mackeson (1981) 75 Cr App R 54; R v Riebold [1967] 1 WLR 674; 
Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 1254, 1296, 1347; Herron v McGregor (1986) 6 
NSWLR 246; However, in Jago v District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23 the court held that the 
general principle is that a permanent stay of proceedings will only be granted in exceptional circumstances; 
Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 which lays out the ‘dominant purpose test’ which should be applied to 
determine the purpose of prosecution, though it has been noted that it is difficult for an accused to establish that 
the DPP instituted proceedings for an improper purpose, see Colvin and McKechnie, above n 10, 703. 
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inherent jurisdiction to protect its own processes from abuse and is not an opportunity for the 
judge to stray beyond a judicial role.291 In the words of McKechnie J: 
 
A Judge is not a Director of Public Prosecutions. It is not enough for a Judge to conclude that 
were he or she to exercise the prosecutorial discretion, in accordance with published 
prosecutorial guidelines, an indictment would not be presented or would be discontinued. A 
Judge can only exercise the power if satisfied that the processes of the Court, having been 
invoked, cannot continue in the interests of justice… In deciding the interests of justice 
require a stay of an indictment a judge should be careful not to stray beyond a proper judicial 
role. The institution and continuation of judicial proceedings is a wholly executive 
function.292 
 
The respective Director of Public Prosecutions Acts authorize the function of prosecutions to 
be carried out by the Director.293 The institution and continuation of criminal proceedings is 
thus a wholly executive function. As is made clear in Maxwell and the aforementioned cases, 
decisions made by the prosecution are seldom subject to judicial review.294 
 
5.4 Guiding the Discretion 
 
Discretion can dangerously be synonymous with unchecked power.295 The worry is that the 
Prosecutor, being only human, is subject to the imperfections of human nature that may be 
reflected in the choices made.296 Research suggests that Prosecutors may bring to bear their 
personal biases in the exercise of their discretion.297 It is the ‘personal synthesis of factors by 
the decision maker’298 and as such can often be secretive and unaccountable. Unbridled 
prosecutorial discretion ‘makes easy the arbitrary, the discriminatory and the oppressive. It 
produces ‘inequality of treatment…and offers a fertile bed for corruption’.299  
 
Even if it were to be assumed, optimistically, that the discretion would at all times be 
exercised in good faith and with honesty, the decision to prosecute often involves evidential 
or legal issues that are matters of professional judgment and inevitably involve a degree of 
subjectivity.300 Accordingly, different Prosecutors may take different perspectives on a 
matter.301 One senior Prosecutor acknowledges that the prosecution service is a ‘human 
                                                 
291 Salmat Document Management Solutions Pty Ltd v R [2006] WASC 65. 
292 Ibid [36]–[37], [41]-[42] (emphasis added). 
293 Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) ss 6(1)(a), (c), (d), 9 (5); Director of Public Prosecutions Act 
1990 (NT) ss 12, 13; Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1986 (NSW) ss 8, 9; Director of Public Prosecutions 
Act 1991 (WA) ss 11, 12; Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1984 (Qld) s 10(1)(a); Director of Public 
Prosecutions Act 1973 (Tas) s 12(1)(a); Public Prosecutions Act 1994(Vic) s 22(1); Director of Public 
Prosecutions Act 1991 (SA) s 7(1)(i).  
294 Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501. 
295 Simons, above n 21, 899. 
296 Davis, above n 32; Poulin, above n 30, 1072. 
297 Kenneth J Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System [1992] Brigham Young University Law 
Review 669, 685-91; Poulin, above n 30, 1080. 
298 Refshauge, above n 25, 359. 
299 Charles D Breital, ‘Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement’ (1960) 27 University of Chicago Law Review 
427, 429. 
300 HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, A report on the joint inspection into the investigation and 
prosecution of cases involving allegations of rape (2002) 45 [8.5]; See also House of Commons Justice 
Committee, The Crown Prosecution Service: Gatekeeper of the Criminal Justice System: Ninth Report of 
Session 2008-2009 (2009) 44-47 which comments on the lack of consistency in the Crown Prosecution Service.  
301 Ibid. 
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institution’302 and ‘no-one makes correct decisions all of the time’,303 further noting that 
cases with circumstantial evidence can often lead to different inferences and different 
perspectives can lead to different decisions.304 
 
Finally, there is the issue of perception and public confidence in the criminal justice system. 
Prosecutorial discretion must not be only be exercised in good faith, free of personal, 
emotional and political influences, but must be seen to be so. Its exercise must be seen to be 
consistent with some fair and transparent standards. There must be a ‘minimum level’ of 
transparency and accountability in accordance with society’s demands. This would in turn 
lend confidence to the notion that prosecutorial discretion is more than the mere arbitrary will 
of the Prosecutor. 
 
The situation begets the question: given the Prosecutor’s status as ‘gate keeper’ of the 
criminal justice system and the potential of the discretion to effect justice or injustice, what 
safeguards are in place to ensure that the exercise of this discretion is carried out and seen to 
be carried out with consistency and not used capriciously or even maliciously? How does one 
ensure that it is ‘not arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular… and exercised 
within the limit to which an honest man, competent in the discharge of his/her office ought to 
confine himself?’305 
 
5.4.1 Prosecutorial Guidelines 
 
Sir Hartley Shawcross, the then Attorney-General of the UK, in a statement to the House of 
Commons, said: 
 
It has never been the rule in this country – I hope it will never be – that suspected criminal 
offences must automatically be the subject of prosecution. Indeed, the very first regulation 
under which the Director of Public Prosecution worked provided that he should intervene to 
prosecute, amongst other cases: 
‘wherever it appears that the offence or the circumstances of its commission is or are of such 
a character that a prosecution in respect thereof is required in the public interest’. 
That is the dominant consideration…306 
 
While the statement was made for an English audience, the statement has been referred to by 
commentators in Australia and has been influential in shaping the prosecutorial landscape in 
Australia.307 This has translated into the initial conceptualization of two elements: first, is 
there sufficient evidence to justify a prosecution and second, is such a prosecution necessary 
in the public interest? 308 
 
 
 
                                                 
302 Lievore, above n 50, 6. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Sharp v Bishop of Wakefield [1981] 1 AC 173, 179 (Lord Halsbury). 
306 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 29 January 1951, vol 483, col 681; Also, 
about the same time when Australia undertook the establishment of its Director of Public Prosecutions, the 
United Kingdom underwent similar reforms, creating its own Crown Prosecution Service, see  Ashworth and 
Redmayne, above n 225, 174-178. 
307 Ross, above n 8, 347; Bugg, above n 109; Refshauge, above n 25, 361. 
308 Rozenes, above n 39; Refshauge, above n 25, 361. 
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5.4.1.1 The Evidentiary Sufficiency 
 
The first element of ‘sufficient evidence’ has been the source of some contention. Upon 
initial interpretation, it was ‘fashionable’ for this to mean a prima facie case.309 This approach 
was however, unsatisfactory as it was evident that a mere prima facie case was often 
insufficient for a jury to find a guilty verdict.310 Given the growing number, and length of 
criminal trials, it was felt that to commit limited resources to cases that would not likely see a 
conviction was, at best, unwise.311 Thus, by the mid-1980s the switch to a ‘reasonable 
prospect of conviction’ standard was thought to be more appropriate as it conserved limited 
resources and lowered the risk that an innocent person would be prosecuted.312 
 
A ‘reasonable prospect of conviction’313 was thus deemed to be a more appropriate test. This 
was interpreted as ‘rather more likely than not that the prosecution will result in a 
conviction’,314 or the ‘51% rule’.315 In the application of this test, the Prosecutor must not 
only consider whether or not the court would convict based on the evidence adduced by the 
prosecution, but must also take into account the impact of any likely defence, the impact of 
any witnesses on the jury and a number of factors that could affect the outcome of a trial in 
order to determine whether or not the prosecution, if initiated, would ‘more likely than not’ 
result in conviction.316 This test was criticized as in some cases, a Prosecutor, no matter how 
experienced, will simply be unable to say whether a conviction or acquittal is the more likely 
result.317 This ‘51%’ rule can also pose a problem in sexual assault cases, where it is often a 
matter of ‘he said versus she said’, falling short of the necessary 51% threshold.318 In the 
1986 guidelines, an attempt was thus made to rectify the issues by subsuming the sufficiency 
of evidence test with ‘public interest considerations’ so that whether a conviction was the 
more likely result became the dominant factor in determining whether the public interest 
required a prosecution.319 This approach however, was also unsatisfactory as the 
incorporation of the sufficiency of evidence test with public interest considerations was 
deemed artificial and difficult to apply in practice.320 
 
                                                 
309 Rozenes, above n 39. 
310 Bugg, above n 156. 
311  Ibid. 
312 Ian Temby, ‘Prosecution Discretion and the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983’ (1985) 59 Australian 
Law Journal 197; Refshauge, above n 25, 361. 
313 Attorney-General’s Department, Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth (1982) [16]; Commonwealth 
Director of Public Prosecutions, Steps in the Commonwealth Prosecution Process 
<http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Practice/Prosecution-Process.pdf> [2]; Rozenes, above n 39; Temby above n 426, 
198. 
314 Ibid. 
315 Ibid. 
316 Rozenes, above n 39. 
317 Ibid. 
318 As mentioned earlier, private prosecution has since been discontinued in WA. Given this, where the 
prosecution has decided not to proceed with a matter, the only option left to the victim of a sexual assault case is 
civil action against the perpetrator. Studies have shown that Prosecutors’ charging decisions in sexual assault 
cases were often guided by the likelihood of conviction, see Spohn and Holleran, above n 45. 
319 Rozenes, above n 39, 7-8. 
320 Ibid 8. 
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So it was in the 1990 version of the guidelines that the Commonwealth adopted the view 
taken by the Victorian Shorter Trials Committee.321 The Committee found that the 
‘reasonable prospects of conviction’ should not be equated with a 51% chance of conviction 
being sustained. It may be something less than that and is not appropriately expressed in 
mathematical terms’.322 Additionally, the ‘reasonable prospect of conviction’ test was the test 
adopted by the Victorian and New South Wales Directors of Public Prosecution, and at a 
general meeting of State and Territory Directors of Public Prosecutions, it was thought 
desirable for all jurisdictions to operate under this same test.323 
 
5.4.1.2 The Public Interest 
 
A second set of considerations is often also taken into account in the exercise of a 
Prosecutor’s discretion. This asks that the Prosecutor look at possible mitigating factors not 
adequately presented in the substantive law.324 These extra-evidential factors are known as 
‘public interest’ considerations,325 and also found their way into the uniform guidelines in 
Australia.326 The cases envisaged are often ones where the harmfulness of the conduct was 
relatively low, or where the offender’s culpability was low, including cases of ‘genuine 
mistake or misunderstanding’ or where the offender is elderly or suffers from a mental 
illness. Given the theory of proportionality,327 it is considered not in the public interest to 
institute full prosecution against these individuals,328  
 
                                                 
321 Ibid 9. 
322 Victorian Shorter Trials Committee, Report on Criminal Trials (Australia Institute of Judicial 
Administration, 1985) [3.53]. 
323 Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, above n 90;  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT), Prosecution Policy and Guidelines of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions (1991)  
<http://www.dpp.act.gov.au/about_the_dpp/the_prosecution_policy>;  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NT), Guidelines and Exercise of General Prosecutorial 
Discretion (1991) < http://www.nt.gov.au/justice/dpp/html/guidelines.html>;  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld), Statement of Prosecution Policy and Guidelines (1995) 
<http://www.justice.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0015/16701/Directors-guidelines.pdf>;  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (SA), Prosecution Policy (1999) 
<http://www.dpp.sa.gov.au/03/prosecution_policy_guidelines.pdf>;  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas), Director of Public Prosecution Guidelines (1994) 
<http://www.crownlaw.tas.gov.au/dpp/prosecution_guidelines>;  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic), Prosecutorial Guidelines (1993) 
<http://www.opp.vic.gov.au/getattachment/c19fca74-1629-41df-a13c-9e017aabd79d/2-The-Prosecutorial-
Discretion.aspx>;  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW), Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions Guidelines 
(2007) 
<http://www.odpp.nsw.gov.au/guidelines/DPP%20Guidelines_whole_document_current%20to%2031_dec_201
0.pdf>; 
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (WA), Statement of Prosecution Policy and Guidelines (1999) 
<http://www.dpp.wa.gov.au/content/statement_prosecution_policy2005.pdf>.  
These guidelines are available from each of the respective Director of Public Prosecution’s websites; Rozenes, 
above n 39, (note 20). 
324 Hor above n 4, 509. 
325 Jones Edwards, The Attorney-General, Politics and the Public Interest (Sweet & Maxwell, 1984) 120-129, 
413-434; Ashworth and Redmayne, above n 225, 159-194. 
326 Refshauge, above n 25, 361. 
327 A von Hirsch and A Ashworth, Principled Sentencing (Hart, 2nd ed, 1998) Ch 4. 
328 Ashworth and Redmayne, above n 226, 185. 
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However, it is important to note that these ‘public interest’ considerations are the next step of 
a two-stage process. The Prosecutor must first be satisfied that there is a ‘reasonable prospect 
of securing a conviction’. If this test is not met, public interest considerations, no matter how 
compelling, are irrelevant.329 The 12 factors featured in the guidelines include matters such as 
the seriousness or triviality of the offence, aggravating or mitigating circumstances, age, 
medical condition, prevalence or obsolescence of the offence, consequences of conviction, 
cost and expenses of a trial and public confidence in the criminal justice system.330 These 
guidelines also provide for the institution and conduct of prosecutions,331 the control of 
prosecutions,332 including their discontinuance,333 declining to proceed after committal,334 
indemnities,335 charge bargaining336 and the choice of charges to be laid.337 
 
5.4.2 The Effect of Prosecutorial Guidelines 
 
In Australia, the primary mechanism for the control of discretion by Prosecutors to ensure its 
fair and accountable exercise is in the form of publicly promulgated guidelines.338 This is 
largely in line with the United Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors requiring 
Prosecutors vested with discretionary functions to provide guidelines for the exercise of such 
powers so as to ensure consistency and fairness in the exercise of the discretion.339 As noted 
by McKechnie, a written prosecution policy is an ‘important keystone of independence’.340 A 
set of guidelines enables a degree of objectivity to be brought to the decision-making process 
and independence is confirmed if the decision maker is able to justify a decision in 
accordance with previously published material.341  
 
5.4.2.1 The Legal Effect 
 
While courts seem to encourage the development and promulgation of guidelines to assist in 
decision making,342 the legal effect and enforceability of prosecutorial guidelines in Australia 
is not entirely clear as there has not yet been any significant judicial decision by Australian 
courts on the matter.343 They are not delegated legislation, merely ‘rules of law’,344 and thus 
sit in an area of legal ambiguity.345 There are however, certain general principles that can be 
                                                 
329 Rozenes, above n 39. 
330 See for example, Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, above n 90 [2.10] which is also reflected 
in the respective Directors of Public Prosecution Guidelines for each state. While some states have made minor 
amendments, there is not a substantive change in the Guidelines with regards to these public interest factors. 
331 Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, above n 90 [3.1]-[3.11]. 
332 Ibid [4.1]. 
333 Ibid [4.2]-[4.6]. 
334 Ibid [6.22]-[6.27]. 
335 Ibid [6.1]-[6.10]. 
336 Ibid [6.14]-[6.21]. 
337 Ibid [2.19]-[2.23]. 
338 Refshauge, above n 25, 359. 
339 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors 
(1990) <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/prosecutors.htm>. 
340 McKechnie, above n 90. 
341 Ibid. 
342 Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethinic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634, 640; British Oxygen 
Co Ltd v Minister of Technology [1971] AC 610, 624 cited in Refshauge, above n 25, 364. 
343 Refshauge, above n 25, 364. 
344 R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Alexander [1982] 1 WLR 1076, 1089; De Falco v Crawley 
Borough Council [1980] QB 460, 478-482. 
345 Refshauge, above n 25; See also Bibas, above n 12 on the difficulty of constraining prosecutorial discretion. 
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drawn. Firstly, the guidelines must be lawful in the sense that they do not include 
considerations incompatible with their enabling statute,346 or other legislation (such as, for 
example, racial discrimination legislation), or preclude the consideration of clearly relevant 
considerations.347 Guidelines that fetter the decision maker’s discretion by leaving no room 
for the exercise of the discretion are legislative in nature and infringe upon the legal principle 
that administrative authorities should not legislate unless express authorization to do so is 
provided for.348 The courts have held that the discretion must not be exercised in blind 
adherence to policy,349 especially where the case in question requires individualized 
judgment,350 as is the case with prosecutorial discretion.351  
 
The non-compliance with prosecutorial guidelines may result in the decision being rendered 
null and void for failure to take into account relevant considerations.352 This may however, be 
subject to privative clauses. For example, section 25(3) of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions Acts 1990 (NT) states that the Director shall not be called into question on the 
ground of a failure to comply with published guidelines.353 Additionally, the courts have 
shown a general reluctance to subject prosecutorial decisions to judicial review as was held in 
the case of Maxwell v The Queen.354 
 
In the UK, however, in R v Chief Constable of the Kent County Constabulary; Ex parte L (a 
minor),355 it was held that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to prosecute was subject 
to judicial review, but only if the decision was made with no consideration of or contrary to 
the established guidelines.356 Similarly, in R v Inland Revenue Commissioner; Ex parte 
Mead,357 it was held that a member of the public had a legitimate expectation that the 
prosecution would follow its own published guidelines.358 Additionally, in R v Commissioner 
of Police of the Metropolis; Ex parte Blackburn,359 it was held that a policy decision not to 
prosecute certain gambling establishments were, in principle, reviewable if Wednesbury 
unreasonableness could be made out.360 
 
While it may be argued that these guidelines provide the aggrieved citizen at least some basis 
for a challenge, in reality of course, this may be difficult to prove given the broad nature of 
the guidelines. Similarly, Australian courts have yet to indicate any definitive position on the 
legal effect of prosecutorial guidelines and while it can be argued that they may be inclined to 
lean towards the English approach based on common law and principles of administrative 
law,361 the reluctance of the courts to interfere in the executive’s exercise of prosecutorial 
                                                 
346 Green v Daniels (1977) 51 ALJR 463, 467. 
347 NCA Brisbane Pty Ltd v Simpson (1986) 70 ALR 10, 47. 
348 Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission v Browning (1947) 74 CLR 492, 506. 
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350 Chumbairux v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1986) 74 ALR 480, 493. 
351 Refshauge, above n 25, 364. 
352 R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Alexander [1982] 1 WLR 1076, 1089, 148 CLR 600, 403. 
353 Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1990 (NT) s 25(3). 
354 Maxwell v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 501, 512, 535. 
355 [1993] 1 All ER 756 
356 R v Chief Constable of the Kent County Constabulary; Ex parte L (a minor) [1993] 1 All ER 756 cited in 
Refshauge, above n 25, 364. 
357 [1993] 1 All ER 772. 
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359 [1968] 2 QB 118. 
360 Ibid; Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223. 
361 Refshauge, above n 25, 365.  
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discretion is a barrier to any successful challenge by an aggrieved accused or a member of the 
public.  
 
 
 
 
5.4.2.2 The Practical Effect 
 
In Australia, prosecutorial guidelines are publicly accessible through the websites of the 
various Directors of Public Prosecutions,362 and in their annual reports.363 Their accessibility 
facilitates plea negotiations between the prosecution and defence counsel (or the accused, if 
                                                 
362 Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, above n 90;  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT), Prosecution Policy and Guidelines of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions (1991)  
<http://www.dpp.act.gov.au/about_the_dpp/the_prosecution_policy>;  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NT), Guidelines and Exercise of General Prosecutorial 
Discretion (1991) < http://www.nt.gov.au/justice/dpp/html/guidelines.html>;  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld), Statement of Prosecution Policy and Guidelines (1995) 
<http://www.justice.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0015/16701/Directors-guidelines.pdf>; Director of Public 
Prosecutions (SA), Prosecution Policy (1999) 
<http://www.dpp.sa.gov.au/03/prosecution_policy_guidelines.pdf>;  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas), Director of Public Prosecution Guidelines (1994) 
<http://www.crownlaw.tas.gov.au/dpp/prosecution_guidelines>;  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic), Prosecutorial Guidelines (1993) 
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Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (WA), Statement of Prosecution Policy and Guidelines (1999) 
<http://www.dpp.wa.gov.au/content/statement_prosecution_policy2005.pdf>.  
Notably, some jurisdictions (such as the UK) have gone one step further and made these policies available in a 
number of languages (Welsh, Arabic, Bengali, French, Gujurati, Polish, Punjabi, Somali, Tamil, Traditional 
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and individuals from a CALD (cultural and linguistically diverse) background: see The Crown Prosecution 
Service, The Code for Crown Prosecutors (February 2010). 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/code_for_crown_prosecutors/index.html>. 
363 Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, CDPP Annual Report 2010/2011 
<http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Publications/AnnualReports/CDPP-Annual-Report-2010-2011.pdf>; Office of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT), Annual Report 2010/2011 
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unrepresented).364 Similarly, while it is arguable that the public availability of these 
documents allows for public scrutiny of the guidelines, it offers some form of accountability 
of the Prosecutors operating throughout the states and territories,365 and ensures that 
Prosecutors act in accordance with these guidelines. This was not always the accepted 
position. In a Law Reform Commission Paper by Cashman and Rizzo, it was noted by a 
prosecuting officer that while prosecutorial guidelines were necessary for the guidance of 
persons who have to make decisions on prosecutions, no useful purpose could be served by 
publicly stating what those guidelines are.366 It was further argued that positive harm might 
result from the public availability of the guidelines by allowing greater scope for delay and 
other tactics by the accused.367 Sallmann also acknowledges that Prosecutors may be 
reluctant to declare such guidelines in a public way as it would make their jobs more 
difficult.368 The suggestion is that while prosecutorial guidelines may be useful, their internal 
circulation is sufficient and it is neither necessary nor appropriate to have them publicly 
promulgated. This warning was, however, not heeded and in 1982 the Commonwealth 
Attorney-General tabled a statement of the Commonwealth’s Prosecution Policy in the 
Senate.369 Today the guidelines of the respective Directors of Public Prosecution are easily 
accessible to anyone with internet access.370 Its practical effect is to allow for a degree of 
public scrutiny and accountability of prosecutorial decisions. It remains to be seen though, 
whether the ‘positive harm’ Cashman and Rizzo warned of will outweigh the benefits of such 
accountability. 
 
As articulated above, there has yet to be a challenge in Australia on the grounds of these 
promulgated prosecutorial guidelines. Indeed, while in theory, the publicly available 
guidelines can offer some semblance of consistency, accountability and public scrutiny, it 
should be noted that the guidelines often allude to general principles.371 They are, at the end 
of the day, overarching guiding principles that do not conclusively assist in the determination 
of a prosecution decision in individual cases. That ultimate decision still lies with the 
Prosecutor.  
 
5.5 The Independence Connundrum 
 
It is this fine balancing act - the need to ensure that the Public Prosecutor is free from 
political influence and the need to ensure a degree of accountability – that has attracted the 
most attention to the prosecution service. Some commentators have noted that Australia’s 
eagerness to de-politicize the prosecution service has its disadvantages, including limited 
                                                 
364 Defence counsel may for example, cite certain portions of the Guidelines that would favour a reduced charge 
in the particular circumstances. 
365 Bugg, above n 65, 9; McKechnie, above n 90.  
366 Peter Cashman and Concetta Rizzo, Social Security Prosecutions (Australian Law Reform Commission 
Research Paper 9, 1982) 77. 
367 Ibid. 
368 Sallmann Willis, above n 54, 65, 83 (note 32). 
369 Cashman and Rizzo, above n 366. 
370 In the United States for example, it was noted that the internet has assisted in curing the defect of the 
inaccessibility of prosecutorial guidelines which may facilitate better control of prosecutorial discretion, see 
Simons, above n 21 (note 181). 
371 The Australian Guidelines allude to general principles. Interestingly though, the United Kingdom’s Crown 
Prosecution Service’s Guidelines are notably more detailed. See The Crown Prosecution Service, Prosecution 
Policy and Guidance <https://www.cps.gov.uk/>. 
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grounds for judicial review372 and near nonexistent parliamentary oversight.373 Australia thus 
walks a fine line between allowing the DPP sufficient independence but ensuring that there is 
at least some oversight of the Director’s duties, given that the Office is an unelected one, 
unanswerable to any constituents. This brings up the question of independence versus 
accountability, as evinced by one report: 
 
It would defy the principles of responsible, democratic government if the Attorney-General 
were to abdicate totally his responsibility for such an important area of government, in favour 
of a person who is not elected, and thus not answerable to Parliament or the community. 
However, it is proper, in order to facilitate a more efficient and consistent prosecution policy, 
and to provide for what is perceived as a more independent decision-making process, that the 
Government should give authority to a person to exercise these powers on a day-to-day 
basis.374 
 
The Australian solution it would seem, transfers the prosecutorial functions of the Attorney-
General to the DPP,375 but still allows for the retention of the residual power of the Attorney-
General as the ‘First Law Officer’.376 This additionally encompasses several obligations 
including the furnishing of an annual report to the Attorney-General with respect to the 
operations of the Office.377 The Attorney-General is further required to provide a copy of that 
report to each House of Parliament within fifteen sitting days of receiving the report.378 The 
system is however, still anxious to keep the Director independent from the Attorney-General. 
This insistence on a separation of prosecutorial function and day to day politics, it would 
seem, is not just an Australian concern. In the UK House of Commons, it was expressed by 
Sir Hartley Shawcross: 
 
That was the view that Lord Birkenhead once expressed on a famous occasion, and Lord 
Simon stated that the Attorney-General: ‘…should absolutely decline to receive orders from 
the Prime Minister, or Cabinet or anybody else that he shall prosecute...’ I would also add to 
that that he should also decline to receive orders that he should not prosecute: That is the 
traditional and undoubted position of the Attorney-General in such matters…379 
                                                 
372 Judicial  review  of prosecutorial  discretion  is  limited to rare  cases  where  an  abuse  of process can  be  
established.  See Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR  501, 513-14. Otherwise, ‘[d]ecisions to commence, not 
to commence[,] or to terminate a prosecution are made independently of the courts’,  Price v Ferris (1994) 34 
NSWLR 704, 708 (Kirby P).  The  High Court has  stated  in  The King v Weaver (1931) 45  CLR  321,  334 that  
‘[i]t  is entirely  a  matter  for the  law  officers  of the Crown  to determine  the form  of prosecution,  and for  
the Court  to determine  whether  the  charge made had been supported’. 
373 E Campbell and H Whitmore, Freedom in Australia (Sydney University Press, 1973) 104 where it is 
suggested that judicial supervision of prosecutions is minimal and Parliamentary control almost nonexistent; 
Refshauge, above n 25; Waye and Marcus, above n 43, 348. 
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Survey’ (Briefing Paper 9/2001, Parliamentary Library, New South Wales, 2001) 14.  
375 Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) s 6(1)(a), (c), (d), 9(5); Director of Public Prosecutions Act 
1990 (NT) ss 12, 13; Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1986 (NSW) ss 8, 9; Director of Public Prosecutions 
Act 1991 (WA) ss 11, 12; Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1984 (Qld) s 10; Director of Public Prosecutions 
Act 1973 (Tas) s 12(1)(a); Public Prosecutions Act 1994 (Vic) s 22(1); Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 
(SA) s 7(1)(i). 
376 Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, above n 90, 4 [1.2]; Damian Bugg,  ‘Accountability, 
Independence and Ethics in the Prosecution Practice’ (Paper delivered at the International Society for the 
Reform of Criminal Law 18th Annual Conference: Keeping Justice Systems Just and Accountable – A Principled 
Approach  in Challenging Times, Montreal, 8 August 2004). 
377 Damian Bugg, ‘The Independence of the Prosecutor and the Rule of Law’ (Paper presented at the Rule of 
Law: The Challenges of a Changing World, Brisbane, 31 August 2007). 
378 Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) s 33. 
379 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 29 January 1951, vol 483, col 681-687. 
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John McKechnie notes that express provisions in the Western Australian Act preclude the 
Attorney-General from giving directions in any particular case, confining his power to 
issuing directions as to general policy.380 In Western Australia, section 27(2) of the Act 
makes it clear that the Attorney-General may not issue directions in respect of a particular 
case,381 with similar provisions in several other jurisdictions within Australia.382  
 
While the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions Act allows for the Attorney-
General to give directions to the DPP in general matters as well as individual cases,383  the 
direction must first be discussed, given in writing and subsequently tabled in Parliament and 
gazetted.384 The then Director, Damian Bugg noted that in the twenty-three years since 1984, 
only four directions have been given.385  None of the directions related to individual 
matters,386 and none interfered with the independence of the Commonwealth DPP.387 This 
demonstrates an adherence to the notion that the Attorney-General, despite having final 
authority, should be slow to interfere with the Director’s prosecutorial functions. 
 
However, the office of the DPP also has its own problems. The role of the DPP is an 
appointed one, and while the office bearer in theory has independence, at least for the 
duration of the appointment, the term of the appointment is not consistent throughout 
Australia. The term of the office can range from 5 years (Western Australia), to a duration to 
be determined by the Governor/Governor-in-Council or the instrument of appointment.388 In 
New South Wales, the term of office was initially a lifetime appointment, until Parliament 
amended this.389 While these measures do not apply retrospectively, a failure to amend the 
pension provisions that required the office holder to retire when they turned 65,390 attracted 
                                                 
380 McKechnie, above n 90, 275. 
381 Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (WA) s 27(2). 
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criticisms of the government exerting pressure on then Director Nicholas Cowdery (who was 
appointed for life) in an attempt to encourage him to retire from office.391 
 
5.5.1 The Case of Paul Nemer 
 
The case of Paul Nemer in 2003 highlights the tensions that can arise between an independent 
DPP and the government. In South Australia, Paul Habib Nemer shot newsagent Geoffrey 
Williams resulting in the loss of William’s eye. A plea bargain was struck between the 
prosecution and the defence, where Nemer would plead guilty to the lesser charge of 
endangering life and the court imposed a three-year good behavior bond.392 There was public 
dissatisfaction with the sentence,393 thought to be inadequate and too lenient given the 
severity of the offence, with allegations that Nemer was treated more favorably because of 
his affluent background.394 Subsequent public pressure resulted in the Attorney-General 
forcing the DPP to appeal the sentence,395 citing section 9 of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions Act, which provided for the Attorney-General to ‘give directions and furnish 
guidelines to the Director in relation to the carrying out of his or her functions’.396 The appeal 
was successful and the initial sentence quashed, with a more severe sentence of four years 
and nine months imprisonment imposed, including a non-parole period of one year and nine 
months.397 
 
The Nemer case brought sharply into focus the difficulty of balancing the need to be properly 
accountable to the community for prosecution decisions made by the office, with the need to 
ensure that those decisions are free from any political influence or even the perception of 
political influence.398 While one may argue that the action taken by the Attorney-General was 
appropriate given his role as ‘First Law Officer’, and the government was exercising its 
power to ‘maintain the accountability of the criminal justice system to Parliament’,399 it is 
also arguable that the actions run contrary to the principle of independence that is the raison 
d’être for the DPP’s establishment. 
 
                                                 
391 ABC Radio, ‘NSW Govt Trying to “Undermine Independence” of the DPP’, The World Today, 26 March 
2008 (Simon Santow); Angela Kamper, ‘DPP Boss Nicholas Cowdery “Felt Pressure to Retire”’, The Daily 
Telegraph (Sydney), 4 December 2010. 
392 R v Nemer (2003) 87 SASR 168.  
393 ABC Radio, ‘Controversial SA Sentence Overturned’, PM, 18 November 2003 (Mark Colvin); ABC Radio, 
‘Nemer Decision Sparks Political Debate, PM, 19 November 2003 (Mark Colvin). Government of South 
Australia, ‘Plea Bargain Reforms Recommended by Kourakis Report’ (News Release, 19 April 2004).  
394  C Hockley, ‘Power of the People’, The Advertiser (South Australia), 31 July 2003, 1. 
395 The Attorney-General’s direction:  
I Paul Holloway, Attorney-General, having consulted with the Director of Public Prosecutions, 
pursuant to the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (SA) s 9(2), direct the Director of Public 
Prosecutions to appeal, pursuant to section 352(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 
1935(SA), to the Full Court against the sentence imposed upon Paul Habib Nemer by Justice Sulan on 
25 July 2003, upon the following grounds which have been settled by the Solicitor General, and I 
further direct that the Director of Public Prosecutions brief the Solicitor General as  counsel on the 
hearing  of any proceedings relating to the appeal  
See Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (SA), Annual Report 2003/2004 
<http://www.dpp.sa.gov.au/03/2003-2004.pdf> 17; Robert Moles, A State of Injustice (Lothian, 2004) Ch 14. 
396 Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (SA) s 9(2). 
397 R v Nemer (2003) 87 SASR 168. 
398 Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (SA), Annual Report 2003/2004 
<http://www.dpp.sa.gov.au/03/2003-2004.pdf> 1, 25. 
399 G Kelton, ‘Government “Vindicated” on Nemer Case’, The Advertiser (South Australia) 17 February 2004, 
12. 
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6. Democratizing Prosecutions: The Japanese Answer 
 
The fact that South Australia’s Attorney-General felt that he had to act and exercise his 
overriding prosecutorial discretion in order to meet public demand raises the question - how 
does the prosecution system fit into a democratic system of governance? How does the voice 
of a dissatisfied victim or the demands of the public feature in the criminal justice system? 
 
Japan answers this question with a unique solution. Similar to Australia, Japan’s prosecution 
landscape is dominated by state actors.400 Prosecutors in Japan serve across various 
hierarchically divided offices - the Local Prosecutors, District Public Prosecutors’ Office, 
High Public Prosecutors’ Office and Supreme Public Prosecutors’ Office, each handling 
matters in the Summary, District, High and Supreme Courts respectively.401 While formally 
part of the Ministry of Justice and overseen by the Minister of Justice, the day to day 
functions of prosecutions are carried out by the Prosecutor-General, a Cabinet appointee.402 
Public Prosecutors also enjoy a status equivalent to that of judges in terms of qualifications 
and salary and cannot be dismissed, suspended or suffer a reduction in salary save in limited 
situations.403 Like Australia, there is no scope for private prosecution and generally, it is 
within the discretion of public prosecutors that the power to initiate criminal proceedings lies. 
There are however, two exceptions to this: quasi-prosecution and the Prosecution Review 
Commission. 
 
6.1 Quasi Prosecution 
 
The first exception is known as ‘quasi-prosecution’404 and is essentially a form of judicial-
sanctioned prosecution. Briefly, this process is triggered when a complaint is filed in the 
courts against the Public Prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute a matter related to an abuse of 
authority by government officials.405 In such circumstances, the court may then, upon 
consideration of the matter, commit the case to trial on its own accord. The court may also 
appoint a member of the Bar to act as the prosecutor in that case.406 While it is an interesting 
example of judicial participation in the prosecution process, it does not appear to be often 
used.407 
 
                                                 
400 UNAFEI, above n 58. 
401 A Didrick Castberg, ‘Prosecutorial Independence in Japan’ (1997) 16 University California Los Angeles 
Pacific Basin Law Journal 38, 42. 
402 Manoa Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan (Oxford University Press, 2002) 
121. This is similar to the Australian situation of having the Attorney-General as First Law Officer but with a 
Director appointed to carry out daily prosecutorial functions. 
403 See Public Prosecutors Office Law, Article 25, cited in United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI), Criminal Justice in Japan (2011) 4. 
404 Saibanjo no junkiso tetsuzuki or ‘quasi-prosecution through judicial action’ - see A Didrick Castberg, 
‘Prosecutorial Independence in Japan’ (1997) 16 University California Los Angeles Pacific Basin Law Journal 
38, 61; UNAFEI, above n 58. 
. See art 262-269 of the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure. An English version is available from the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s website <http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanti-
corruptioninitiative/46814489.pdf>. 
405 United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 
(UNAFEI), Criminal Justice in Japan, 23. 
406 Art 268 Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure. 
407 According to United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders (UNAFEI), Criminal Justice in Japan, 23 as of 2011 only 3 out of 4724 applications for quasi-
prosecutions were granted.  
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6.2 Prosecution Review Commission 
 
The second exception is known as the Prosecution Review Commission (PRC).408 Some have 
likened the Prosecution Review Commission to a United States’ grand jury system that 
embeds into the prosecution system, democratic participation.409 Historically, the power to 
prosecute lies exclusively with the state. It was post-World War II intervention by the Allied 
Powers that saw the PRC set up, in an attempt to democratize the prosecution landscape.410 
The PRC comprises eleven citizens drawn randomly from the register of voters,411 each 
serving a six-month term and convenes when an aggrieved victim challenges the Prosecutor’s 
Office’s decision not to prosecute a matter.412 The PRC may also initiate reviews of its own 
volition.413 During the hearing, it has the powers to call on witnesses, question Prosecutors 
and seek expert advice.414 After hearing the evidence, the PRC may deliver one of the 
following recommendations to the Prosecutor’s Office:415   
 
(i) non-prosecution is proper;  
(ii) non-prosecution is improper; or  
(iii) prosecution is proper. 416 
 
A simple majority is required for the first two recommendations while the last requires a 
special majority vote of eight out of eleven Committee members.417 The recommendation 
                                                 
408 Or ‘kensatsu shinsakai’ where ‘kensatsu’ literally means prosecution, ‘shinsa’ means investigation and the 
suffix ‘kai’ means meeting, see  West, above n 54, 685 footnote 9. 
409 Hiroshu Fukurai, ‘Japan’s Prosecution Review Commissions: Lay Oversight of the Government’s Discretion 
of Prosecution’ (2011) 6 University of Pennsylvania East Asia Law Review 1, 6. The similarities between the US 
style Grand Jury and the PRC are understandable, given their historical ties, however, there are also distinct 
differences between the two models – I do not propose to canvas these here but see Carl Goodman, ‘Prosecution 
Review Commissions, The Public Interest and the Right of the Accused: The Need for a “Grown up” in the 
room’ (2013) 22 Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 1 for a detailed analysis.   
410 See West, above n 54; Fukurai, above n 409, 3 which suggest that General MacArthur was one of the key 
influencers for the system of PRC. See also Howard Meyers, ‘Comment: The Japanese Inquest of Prosecution 
(1950) 64 Harvard Law Review 279, 280-281 and Hiroshu Fukurai, Japan’s Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems 
as Deliberative Agents of Social Change: De-colonial Strategies and Deliberative Participatory Democracy 
(2011) 86 Chicago-Kent Law Review 789 for a detailed historical account. 
411 Kensatsu Shinsakai Hō (Prosecutorial Review Commission Act), Law No 147 of 1948, 
art 4 <http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S23/S23HO147.html> (‘PRC Act’). See Fukurai, above n 409, 12-15 for a 
comprehensive outline of the PRC selection system. Each Commissioner serves a six-month term and 
approximately half of the Commission is selected every three months. Members cannot serve consecutive terms. 
See Carl Goodman, ‘Prosecution Review Commissions, The Public Interest and the Right of the Accused: The 
Need for a “Grown up” in the room’ (2013) 22 Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 1, 11. 
412 A suitable proxy of the victim can also challenge the decision, see West, above n 54. However, the issue of 
who has ‘standing’ to bring a matter to the PRC has also caused some debate – see Goodman, above n 409, 15. 
413 West, above n 54, 697. 
414 Art 35-37 PRC Law; Fukurai, above n 409, 8. 
415 UNAFEI, above n 403; Fukurai, above n 409, 3. 
416 It should be noted that the difference between the recommendation ‘non-prosecution is improper’ and 
‘prosecution is proper’ has been criticized. The Japanese Federation of Bar Associations has long maintained 
that the two share the same legal status and both recommendations should require a two-thirds majority.  In 
2001, the Justice System Reform Council proposed that both recommendations be made legally binding, while 
the Ministry of Justice proposed that only the third ‘prosecution is proper’ recommendation is made legally 
binding.  
417 UNAFEI, above n 403; Fukurai, above n 409, 8. 
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however, up until recently, was only regarded as advisory.418 The Prosecutor’s Office may, 
despite the recommendation, decline prosecution.419  
 
This has changed, however, since May 2009 with the amendment of the PRC law.420 Under 
the new law, when faced with a recommendation from the PRC to prosecute, the Prosecutor’s 
Office may, in the first instance, still decline upon presenting to the PRC, reasons for the 
decision.421 The PRC, if unconvinced, may issue a second, legally binding resolution 
compelling the Prosecutor’s Office to commence prosecution.422 
 
6.1.1 The Akashi Stampede 
 
On 21 July 2001, 130,000 people gathered to observe a fireworks display on a shoreline in 
Akashi.423 A stampede later occurred on a bridge connecting the train station and the 
shoreline. A report later found that the local police, among others, were responsible for the 
incident as they failed to take the necessary precautions despite being warned of the stampede 
risk.424  
 
However, the Prosecutor’s Office took no action against the police responsible.425 Families of 
the victims filed an appeal with the PRC and a ‘prosecution is proper’ recommendation was 
issued.426 Prosecutors ignored the recommendation, leading to a second PRC review and a 
further, albeit still non-binding recommendation in 2005 reiterating that ‘prosecution is 
proper’. Again, prosecutors took no action.  
 
On 29 May 2009, the day that amendments to the PRC law made recommendations binding, 
the families lodged a further appeal, resulting in the first recommendation of the PRC under 
the new regime that ‘prosecution is proper’. The Prosecutor’s Office again maintained its 
position of non-prosecution, but because of the new PRC law, was obliged to furnish reasons 
for doing so. The PRC, unsatisfied with those reasons, issued a final and legally binding 
resolution on 27 January 2010 directing that Deputy Chief of Police Kazuki Sakaki be 
prosecuted.427 Three private lawyers were appointed by the Court to act as prosecutors in the 
                                                 
418 (emphasis added). 
419 A Didrick Castberg, ‘Prosecutorial Independence in Japan’ (1997) 16 University California Los Angeles 
Pacific Basin Law Journal 38, 61; UNAFEI, above n 611. 
420 See art 41(6)(1) of PRC Act; Kensatsu Shinsakai Kisosoto 2kaide Kisoe [PRC: Forced Prosecution by 
Second Indictment Resolution], Asahi Shimbun, 19 May 2009 
<http://www.asahi.com/special/080201/TKY200905180395.html>, cited in Fukurai, above n 409, 41.  
Notably, the Japanese Federation of Bar Association has long advocated for recommendations of the PRC to be 
legally binding - See Japanese Federation of Bar Association, The Proposed Amendment to the Prosecutorial 
Review Commission: To Enrich and Strengthen (1975) cited in Fukurai, above n 409. 
421 Art 41(2)(2), 41(6)(2) PRC Act; UNAFEI, above n 404, Fukurai, above n 409. 
422 41(6)(1) PRC Act; Fukurai, above n 409. 
423 See Fukurai, above n 409, 15 for a detailed outline of the incident. 
424 ‘Panel Finds City, Police at Fault in Fireworks Stampede’, Japan Economic Newswire, 30 Jan 2002.  
425 Fukurai, above n 409, 15. The Chief and Deputy Chief of the police station responsible were not indicted, see 
Goodman, above n 409, 22. 
426 Ibid.  
427 See Fukurai, above n 409, 17 for a detailed outline of the incident. ’ Citizens Force Charge on Ex-police 
Deputy’, The Asashi Shimbun, 28 Jan 2010 <http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201001270404.html>. 
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matter.428 The Deputy Chief became the first person to be formally indicted by a citizen’s 
panel.429 
 
6.1.2 The Fukuchisen Derailment 
 
Another notable incident occurred on 25 April 2005, where a train on the West Japan 
Railway Fukuchiyama Line derailed in the Hyogo prefecture, resulting in the deaths of 107 
people and 555 more injured. On 8 July 2009, prosecutors initiated prosecution against West 
Japan Railway’s president, Masao Yamazaki, after concluding that his negligence contributed 
to the accident.430  
 
However, prosecutors took no action against the West Japan Railway’s former executives, all 
of whom had some responsibility over safety. Aggrieved, the victims’ families appealed to 
the PRC and on 22 October 2009, the Kobe PRC recommended prosecution against the past 
three presidents of the West Japan Railway.431 Despite this, prosecutors indicated that no 
charges would be preferred against the three previous presidents as investigations revealed 
that they were not responsible for the system that resulted in the derailment.  Ultimately, 
upon hearing from families of the victims and hearing the prosecutor’s explanation the Kobe 
PRC issued a resolution that the three former presidents of West Japan Railway be charged 
with professional negligence resulting in injury and death.432 Three private lawyers were 
appointed by the court to act as prosecutors in the matter and filed formal charges against all 
three past presidents.433 
 
Both incidents in Japan’s history point to the PRC acting as a safeguard against any arbitrary 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in Japan. As suggested above, in cases where the 
government may be reluctant to commence prosecution against political heavyweights and 
the economic elites, the PRC gives the aggrieved victim (or their families) an avenue of 
recourse. It plays a powerful role in checking the powers of government and allows the public 
voice to be heard in the criminal justice system.  
 
6.3 Criticisms of the System 
 
6.3.1 Obscurity and Ignorance 
 
                                                 
428 Fukurai, above n 409; Goodman, above n 409, 22. 
429 See Fukurai, above n 409, 1. Despite the mandatory prosecution, it appears that the Kobe District Court has 
dismissed the charges against Kazuki Sakaki – see Yomiuri, ‘Ex-deputy chief cleared over Akashi crush’, News 
On Japan, Feb 21, 2013 <http://www.newsonjapan.com/html/newsdesk/article/101084.php>. There have also 
been comments that there is an alarming number of ‘not guilty’ verdicts in PRC compelled prosecutions. While 
intriguing, an analysis of this is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper. See Cherrie Lou Billones, 
‘Alarming Number of ‘Not Guilty’ Verdicts Found in Mandatory Indictments’, Japan Daily Press, 22 Feb 2013 
<http://japandailypress.com/alarming-number-of-not-guilty-verdicts-found-in-mandatory-indictments-
2223948>. 
430 Fukurai, above n 409. 
431 ‘Crash Inquest Panel: Indict Ex-JR West Heads’, Japan Times, 23 Oct 2009 
<http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20091023a1.html>. 
432 Fukurai, above n 409. 
433 Ibid. The trial against the executives concluded in January 2012 and the accuseds were acquitted of the 
charges – see Goodman, above n 409, 22, footnote 96; ‘Former President’s Acquittal doesn’t lessen JR’s 
responsibility for disaster’, Asashi Shimbum, 12 Jan 2012 < 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201201120048>.  
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Ironically, this democratic system that reflects the popular will is hardly popular. Critics have 
noted that it is seldom used.434 In a poll conducted by the Japanese Cabinet, the majority of 
respondents had no knowledge of the PRC system.435 This ignorance extends to jurists as 
well as lay-persons.436 One law Professor at Tokyo University acknowledged this 
ignorance.437 There is also a general reluctance to question the prosecution service.438 This 
could, of course in and of itself indicate that the system is after all, a final safeguard which 
may not be entirely necessary where prosecutorial discretion is being exercised 
responsibly.439 Arguably, despite being rarely used, the PRC system at least provides an 
option for the aggrieved victim, if necessary.440  
 
6.1.2 Structural Limitations 
 
Another, more structural, limitation of the system is that it only addresses a claim that a 
prosecution was improperly dropped.441 In this regard, it provides the aggrieved victim with 
legal recourse through the PRC, who may then compel the prosecution to commence criminal 
proceedings. It does not provide recourse to an accused person who feels prosecution has 
been wrongly commenced against him/her.442 An aggrieved person’s only avenue of address 
is through the courts. 
 
The PRC system in its current form is also unable to address the criticisms of plea bargaining. 
The decision to enter or accept a plea bargain is still within the Public Prosecutor’s discretion. 
Similarly, the precise offence on which a charge is predicated lies outside the scope of the 
PRC. The PRC system does not interfere with prosecutorial discretion in these areas and this 
is arguably a good thing. While some degree of democratic participation is beneficial to the 
system, there must be a careful balancing act. As discussed above, prosecutorial discretion on 
some matters, arguably allows for the Prosecutor to take into account the realities of the 
criminal justice system and allocate the finite resources of the state accordingly.  
 
6.4 Benefits of the System 
 
6.4.1 Popular Oversight 
 
However, despite these criticisms, the PRC has a number of useful functions. As highlighted 
above, it allows for the victim’s voice to feature in the prosecution landscape – a landscape 
that has far too often been dominated by state actors. Additionally, and perhaps more 
importantly, the PRC serves as popular oversight and as a civic watchdog over government 
                                                 
434 Setsuko Kamiya, ‘Inquest fuels ardour for democracy’, Japan Times, 27 Feb 2005 
<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2005/02/27/to-be-sorted/inquest-service-fuels-ardor-for-democracy>. 
435 Japanese Cabinet Office, Public Relations, Public Opinion Poll on the PRC System  (1990), available at 
<http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h02/H02-10-02-15.html> cited in Fukurai, above n 403, 8; West, above n 403, 
699-702. 
436 West, above n 409, 700. 
437 See Nobuyoshi Toshitani, Are You Familiar With Prosecution Review Commissions?  cited in West, above n 
403, 700. 
438 William Clifford, Crime Control in Japan (1976) 103. 
439 Shigemitsu Dando, The System of Discretionary Prosecution in Japan (1970) 18 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 528. 
440 Ibid. 
441 Marcia E Goodman, ‘The Exercise and Control of Prosecutorial Discretion in Japan’ (1986) 5 University of 
California Pacific Basin Law Journal 16, 55. 
442 Ibid. 
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action in Japan.443 The requirement to furnish reasons for non-prosecution upon a PRC’s 
initial recommendation is also a markedly different approach from the Australian position 
which has maintained that Prosecutors need not and typically do not provide reasons for their 
decisions. The Japanese system puts in place an additional layer of safeguard to ensure that 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, especially against those with political and economic 
influence, is properly exercised.444 It democratizes prosecutions in Japan by providing an 
element of accountability, transparency and independence in the prosecution system.  
 
6.4.2 Inspiring Confidence 
 
The PRC system also benefits the community by inspiring confidence in the criminal justice 
system. Those who have served on the PRC feel that lay participation in the system functions 
as a deterrent against crimes in the community.445 Despite the aforementioned reluctance to 
question authoritative figures, Fukurai’s work suggests that those who have been through the 
PRC process come away with a greater sense of confidence in the criminal justice system.446 
 
An aggrieved victim is also comforted by the fact that there is an avenue of redress. Notably, 
and as discussed above, upon receipt of the PRC’s first recommendation that ‘prosecution is 
proper’, the prosecution, if still maintaining its position of non-prosecution, must furnish 
reasons. By having to provide reasons, the Prosecutor is forced to take additional care in the 
analysis of the decision. Here, the aggrieved victim may take some comfort in knowing that 
the decision is not the mere arbitrary will of a Prosecutor.  
 
6.4.3 Educative Functions 
 
Finally, there may also be some educative value in lay participation in the criminal justice 
system. Aside from coming to terms with their civic duties, Fukurai documents evidence of 
previous members of the PRC coming away with a better understanding of the structural 
mechanisms and legal relations between the prosecution, courts and the police.447 The PRC 
system raises awareness of the criminal justice system and the crucial role the Prosecutor 
plays and allows members of the public to understand the myriad of factors that are taken into 
account in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  
 
6.4 Transplantation – Can the PRC System Work in Australia? 
 
Criticisms of the failings of the PRC system revolve around a number of factors.448 The first 
problem is the prior non-binding nature of the decisions of the PRC. Although there is some 
                                                 
443 Kirtland C Marsh, ‘To Charge or Not to Charge’ (2006) 16 Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 561. 
444 Ibid. 
445 Fukurai, above n 409, 20. See also the positive experience cited by previous members of the PRC in Setsuko 
Kamiya, ‘Inquest fuels ardour for democracy’, 27 Feb 2005, Japan Times 
<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2005/02/27/to-be-sorted/inquest-service-fuels-ardor-for-democracy>. 
446 Ibid. See generally John Gastil, Hiroshu Fukurai, Kent Anderson and Mark Nolan, ‘Seeing is Believing: The 
Impact of Jury Service on Attitudes Toward Legal Institutions and the Implications for International Jury 
Reform’ (2012) 48 Court Review 124. See also Setsuko Kamiya, ‘Inquest fuels ardour for democracy’, 27 Feb 
2005, Japan Times <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2005/02/27/to-be-sorted/inquest-service-fuels-ardor-for-
democracy> and Fukurai, above n 409, 25. 
447 Fukurai, above n 409, 26. 
448 West, above n 54, 702. 
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social check on the Prosecutor’s power,449 the lack of binding force in the PRC’s verdicts 
essentially defeats the purpose of a system to provide democratic oversight of Prosecutors.450 
This defect however, has arguably been remedied with the amendment to the PRC law in 
May 2009, as discussed above.451 
 
The second issue and one more difficult to resolve in Japan is the Japanese legal culture. 
West discusses this at some length and the discourse indicates that the Japanese trust in 
authority figures and the non-litigious nature of Japanese culture makes it difficult for the 
PRC system to gain prominence as a cornerstone in the criminal justice system.452 It has been 
suggested that Japanese citizens place a great deal of trust in their public Prosecutors.453 This 
has translated to a reluctance by the general public to question the judgment of Prosecutors 
and similarly, an unwillingness by members of the PRC to adjudicate over public Prosecutors 
who as seen as authority figures.454 
 
However, this issue of culture is arguably limited to a Japanese context. There is little 
evidence to suggest that similar issues would be encountered in Australia. Indeed, if anything, 
the South Australian example of Nemer demonstrates a growing public demand for popular 
oversight of the prosecution service in Australia. In the political arena, there is also on-going 
debate about the community voice featuring in the criminal justice system.455 In Western 
Australia, the Australian Labor Party has proposed a Western Australian Sentencing Council 
to ensure sentences passed are in line with community expectations.456 The proposed Council 
would comprise the Chief Justice and include as members, the Chief Judge of the District 
Court, Chief Magistrate, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Commissioner of Police and 
- most significantly - two members of the public.457 While it is structurally different from the 
PRC, the trend is discernible – the demand to include popular will of the collective in the 
criminal justice system. It is submitted then that the Japanese PRC system, while a brave new 
move, is certainly one that Australia can consider to ensure it has a prosecution service that is 
transparent, independent and accountable.458 
 
                                                 
449 Ibid. 703. See generally John Haley, ‘Introduction: Legal vs Social Controls’ (1984) Law in Japan: An 
Annual 1. 
450 West, above n 54, footnote 105. 
451 See above page 60. 
452 West, above n 54, 707. 
453 Clifford, above n 432. See also Setsuko Kamiya, ‘Inquest fuels ardour for democracy’, Japan Times, 27 Feb 
2005 <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2005/02/27/to-be-sorted/inquest-service-fuels-ardor-for-democracy>. 
454 West, above n 54, 707, footnote 127. 
455 See for example, the Australian Labor Party’s proposal of an Australian Sentencing Council to ensure 
sentences handed down reflect community standards. The proposed Comprise Chief Justice and include as 
members the Chief Judge, Chief Magistrate, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Commissioner of Police 
and, most importantly, two members of the public - – Western Australia Labor Party, WA Labor’s policy to 
judge the judges (17 February 2013)  <http://walabor.org.au/news/2013/02/17/wa-labors-policy-to-judge-the-
judges>. 
456 Ibid. 
457 Ibid. 
458 Hiroshi Fukurai has himself suggested that the Prosecution Review Commission should be considered in 
Australia, see H Fukurai, Japan’s lay judges and why Australia should listen up (28 June 2012) East Asia 
Forum < http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/06/28/citizen-adjudication-systems-in-japan-and-why-australia-
should-follow-suit/>. 
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Having said that, one must of course be cautious about the wholesale transplantation of an 
entirely different legal system.459 The Japanese concept, while normatively attractive, is 
based on a civil law tradition – inherently different from the common law tradition which is 
founded on incremental developments of the law and where legal safeguards on prosecutorial 
discretion are still slowly being developed.460 While the PRC system is one useful safeguard 
to ensure the proper discharge of prosecutorial discretion, it certainly is not the only means of 
doing so and may not be entirely necessary in jurisdictions with existing measures to ensure 
the proper and responsible exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In any consideration of 
adopting the PRC system in any jurisdiction, one must take into account the jurisdiction’s 
existing safeguards, legal tradition and the cultural-social-political milieu.  
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The debate on prosecutorial discretion will continue to be a controversial one. The power 
over life, liberty and sometimes death that prosecutorial discretion confers on the state must 
be heavily scrutinized. The Australian landscape has seen significant historical developments 
that have resulted in its current prosecution system. It has aimed to be a system that is 
transparent, accountable and independent and to some extent it has succeeded in this regard. 
Nonetheless, there is still a growing centralization of power in the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor. Broadly defined statutes, overcriminalisation and mandatory punishment all add 
to the increasing discretion that the Prosecutor wields.  
 
As revealed by the case of Paul Nemer, the system is not without its defects and there is a 
growing public demand to address the issues. As discussed above, there are a number of 
measures that jurisdictions can employ to prevent the arbitrary exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion The Japanese PRC system is one possible solution that the Japanese have used to 
allow for a check on the ever expanding discretion of the public Prosecutor. In light of the 
centralization of power in the office of the Prosecutor, Australia will need to assess whether 
public demand for greater oversight of prosecutorial functions should be acceded to. If so, it 
can look to the experience of others, including Japan with its PRC system and assess the 
extent to which some of its features can be incorporated.  In the search for continual 
improvement, Australia can look beyond its borders to consider ‘taking a leaf from another 
jurisdiction’s book’ as an additional layer of safeguards to ensure transparency, 
accountability and independence in its prosecution service.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
459 See for example D Berkotiwz, K Pistor and J Richard, ‘The Transplant Effect’ (2003) 51 American Journal 
of Comparative Law 163. 
460 In the UK for example, the recent cases R v DPP, Ex Parte E & Ors [2011] EWHC 1465 (Admin); Wilson’s 
(Jason) Application [2012] NIQB 102; Rv Crown Prosecution Service, Ex Parte Gujra [2012] UKSC show that 
the law on prosecutorial discretion is still being developed.  
